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Abstract
The contribution of Prescott and Mehra (1985) to the asset pricing literature trig-
gered an enormous amount of research addressing the so called equity premium puzzle.
In the following thesis I will briefly review the origins of asset pricing by presenting the
seminal paper of Lucas (1978) and deriving simple closed-form asset pricing equations.
In the second part of the thesis a brief review of the equity premium puzzle based on
Prescott and Mehra (1985) and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) will be given. Finally,
I will discuss the approach of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) which tries to resolve the
puzzle by introducing an alternative class of utility function that accounts for what is
known as habit formation.
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Equity Premium Puzzle
1 Introduction
The following thesis provides an overview of the so called equity premium puzzle first pub-
lished in Prescott and Mehra (1985). Prescott and Mehra published their paper in response
to seminal works by Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979). The equity premium observed em-
pirically deviates significantly from its pendant predicted by consumption-based equilibrium
models like the Lucas tree model and the CCAPM. A large number of explanations exist to
adress the problem. I split the thesis into 3 parts. Part 1 serves as a basic introduction to
general equilibrium asset pricing and introduces a simple contingent claims equilibrium as
well as a more realistic setting in the form of a security market equilibrium. The major part
of this section will describe the fundamental tree model as in Lucas (1978) and the closely
related model in Breeden (1979). In part 2 the equity premium puzzle will be introduced as
in Prescott and Mehra (1985). This section will be split into 2 subparts, namely a theory
part to review the basic idea of the Presoctt/Mehra paper and an empirical part to illustrate
the most important findings from real-world data. Empirics will consist mainly of readily
available data and results as in Campbell (1999). The final part then introduces the concept
of habit formation which is one of the most powerful modeling frameworks to explain the
puzzle. I will discuss the external habit version of Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
2 General Equilibrium Asset Pricing
In general equilibrium theory economies are viewed as systems in which the equilibrium
values of the main variables of interest - consumption, production, asset prices - are de-
termined simultaneously. Economic agents interact with each other through anonymous
markets. Markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive, i.e. agents act as price takers
and cannot influence them individually. One of the earliest works on general equilibrium
theory was published by Walras (1874). Debreu (1959) extended Walras’ work and provided
conditions that guarantee existence of an equilibrium. With the two Fundamental Theorems
of Welfare Debreu (1959) provided conditions (local-non satiation and transitivity of pref-
erences) under which a competitive equilibrium leads to a Pareto efficient allocation (first
theorem) and how an efficient allocation may be sustainable by a competitive equilibrium
(convexity of production and consumption set; second theorem). Hirshleifer (1965), Hir-
shleifer (1966) and Radner (1972) were the first papers to provide an integrated approach
by explicitly taking financial markets into account in their models. This literature was in
turn extended by Merton (1973), Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979). The Lucas tree model
and the Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM ) are two of the major
building blocks of what is called equilibrium asset pricing theory.
2.1 A Contingent Claim Economy
In the following section we will describe a simple one-period pure endowment economy and
show how equilibria are determined in such settings, i.e. what prices and allocations ensure
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utility maximization for all agents as well as market clearing. As stated initially, only a
one-period economy with a finite number of possible future states s is considered. Agents in
such an economy negotiate contracts with each other that yield a certain payoff contingent
on the realized future state s and may trade claims to such contracts for all possible states s.
Such contingent claims are also often referred to as Arrow-Debreu securities (see Danthine
and Donaldson (2005), p. 147). Arrow-Debreu securities are characterzized by the fact that
they yield a payoff of 1 if a certain state s occurs and 0 otherwise. The realization of s is
unknown at t = 0. Only the probability distribution over the set of possible future states
is known. The realized state becomes known as soon as all contracts have been negotiated
and trading takes place.
2.1.1 Model and Assumptions
In the following a formal definition of the underlying model is described as in Altug and
Labadie (2008).
• There are finitely many consumers, {1, 2, . . . , I}.
• Each possible future state s is assigned a probability πs ∈ (0, 1) such that
S∑
s=1
πs = 1.
The set of states and the probabilities associated with each state s are known by all
consumers.
• There is one commodity only.
• Consumption vectors for individual agents are of length S
ci ≡ {ci1, . . . , ciS}.
The vector components cis ∈ R+ denote the consumption of the commodity of agent
i in state s. The commodity space is therefore RS+ and is finite-dimensional since we
assumed a finite number of states and one single commodity respectively.
• For each agent i there is an endowment vector of length S of the form
ωi ≡ {ωi1, . . . , ωiS}.
• Each agent i has a utility function ui : RS+ → R. The function ui is assumed to be
separable with respect to states.
ui(c
i) =
S∑
s=1
πs · Ui(cis).1
1This implies that preferences are additively separable across states s. Here total utility ui of a con-
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• Finally, we can summarize a contingent claim economy as a list {(ui, ωi) : i = 1, . . . , I}.
Each agent i is fully characterized by the tuple (ui, ωi) (see Lengwiler (2006), p. 24).
Having introduced the model setup we will proceed with some important definitions.
• A vector C ≡ (c1, . . . , cI) with C ∈ RS×I+ is called an allocation.
• An allocation C is called feasible or attainable if
I∑
i=1
(cis − ωis) ≤ 0
for all s = 1, . . . , S. Thus, all consumers together can at most consume their total
endowment with the consumption good in state s.
• An allocation C is called Pareto optimal if no other feasible allocation C ≡ (c1, . . . , cI)
exists such that
ui(c
i) ≥ ui(ci)
for all i = 1, . . . , I and
ui(c
i) > ui(c
i)
for some i.
2.1.2 Contingent Claim Equilibrium
In what follows Altug and Labadie (2008) define a so called complete contingent claims
equilibrium (CCE). Before the realization of a particular state s agents trade contingent
claims. A contingent claim may state that an agent i transfers a certain amount of the
commodity of his endowment ωi to agent k given a certain state s is realized. A total of S
contingent claims are traded in that economy (one claim for each of the S possible states).
Let p ∈ RS+ be a price vector of the form p ≡ (p1, . . . , pS) and ps ∈ R+ be the price of a
claim to one unit of the commodity contingent on state s. A mapping p : RS+ → R+ is called
a price system and assigns a cost to a commodity c and a value to an arbitrary endowment
ω (see also Debreu (1959)). Thus,
p · cT ≡
S∑
s=1
ps · cs = p1 · c1 + . . .+ pS · cS .
So, the cost of a bundle is the inner product of the price vector p and commodity bundle
c. A competitive equilibrium then is a pair (p, C) with price vector p ≥ 0 and C is feasible2
such that ci solves the following constrained optimization problem for all i = 1, . . . , I:
max
ci
ui(c
i)
sumption vector ci can be represented as a weighted sum of utilities Ui of state contingent consumption
cis.
20 denotes the null vector of length S.
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subject to
p · ciT ≤ p · ωiT .
2.1.3 Deriving a Contingent Claim Equilibrium
Altug and Labadie (2008) compute an equilibrium vector of prices by means of simple
Lagrange multipliers. Let cis denote the consumption of agent i in state s. Each agent i
chooses a consumption vector ci ∈ RS+ by solving the following optimization problem:
max
{cis}
S
s=1
S∑
s=1
πs · Ui(cis)
subject to
S∑
s=1
ps · (ωis − cis) ≥ 0. (1)
The utility function Ui(.) is assumed to satisfy the following properties (Inada conditions).
Let Ui : R+ → R be a concave, increasing C2 function with
lim
cis→0
(
∂Ui(c
i
s)
∂cis
)
= lim
cis→0
U ′i(c
i
s) = +∞
and
lim
cis→∞
(
∂Ui(c
i
s)
∂cis
)
= lim
cis→0
U ′i(c
i
s) = 0.
By the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem we can find a multiplier λi ≥ 0 and a consumption vector ci
such that
ui(c
i) + λi · (p · ωiT − p · ciT ) (2)
is maximized with respect to ci. Equation (2) can be rephrased as
L =
S∑
s=1
πs · Ui(cis) + λi ·
(
S∑
s=1
ps · ωis − ps · cis
)
being the Lagrangian to be optimized with respect to ci. The first-order conditions (FOC)
thus are
πs · U ′i(cis)− λi · ps = 0 (3)
for all s and i. Define
gi(.) ≡ (U ′i)−1(.) .
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Rearranging equation (3) we get
U ′i(c
i
s) =
ps · λi
πs
. (4)
One can show that, by the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT), the following holds:
cis = gi
(
ps · λi
πs
)
for all s and i. To obtain the equilibrium allocation we can substitute above equation into
the original budget constraint (1)
S∑
s=1
ps ·
[
ωis − gi
(
ps · λi
πs
)]
= 0.
Since prices, endowments and state probabilities are given we obtain a function of λi for all
i = 1, . . . , I. The left-hand side (lhs) is strictly increasing in λi. This can easily be derived
from equation (4). When λi increases marginal utility U
′
i(.) also increases. Since Ui(.) is
concave, marginal utility only increases when consumption decreases. Hence, if λi increases
gi(.) must decrease. Thus, by the IFT, one can express λi as a function of prices. So,
λi = ζi(p), ∀i.
Finally,
I∑
i=1
gi
(
ζi(p) · ps
πs
)
=
I∑
i=1
ωis
can be solved for the price vector p for all states s = 1, . . . , S.
2.2 An Asset Economy
The model introduced in the previous section has a few drawbacks. Contingent claim mar-
kets in the narrower sense of its definition do not exist for most commodities. What is
observable for actual economies are (physical) goods as well as financial markets (see Leng-
wiler (2006), p. 37). The following section is therefore supposed to extend the previous
simple general equilibrium model by introducing the notion of an asset market to derive
a security market equilibrium. The claims traded on such financial markets are claims to
random payoffs denominated in monetary terms rather than commodities as shown in the
previous section.
2.2.1 Model and Assumptions
As in the contingent claim economy security trading takes place before the state s is realized.
Also, trading in the commodity markets only takes place after security trading has ended.
Let us assume the following:
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• There are finitely many securities (1, . . . , N).
• Each security n yields a certain (absolute) payoff xn,s for all states s = 1, . . . , S. The
vector of security payoffs in state s thus is xs ≡ (x1,s, . . . , xN,s).
• Let X be an N × S payoff matrix of the form
X ≡


x1,1 . . . x1,S
...
. . .
...
xN,1 . . . xN,S


.
• Let q = (q1, . . . , qN ) denote the vector of security prices.
• Let ps ∈ R+ denote the price of the commodity in state s and p ∈ RS+ the price vector
of the commodity for states s = 1, . . . , S (analogous definition to previous section
2.1.1).
A portfolio is a vector θi ≡ (θi1, . . . , θiN ) ∈ RN . The vector components θin can be interpreted
as the number of shares of security n held by agent i. Hence, the inner product θi ·qT equals
the portfolio value. Since θn ∈ R we allow for negative portfolio weights which is called
short-selling (see Hull (2008) for details).
An agent’s objective is to choose a portfolio θi ∈ RN and a consumption vector ci ∈ RS+ by
solving the following constrained optimization problem for given prices (q, p):
max
ci,θi
ui(c
i) =
S∑
s=1
πs · Ui(cis)
subject to
θi · qT ≤ 0
ps · cis
T ≤ ps · ωis
T
+ θi · xsT .
The first constraint simply states that an agent cannot generate positive net wealth by
buying and selling securities, i.e. he can only invest the proceeds earned from short-selling.
Hence, every purchase of a security must be financed by selling another security. This is also
known as a self-financing portfolio. His initial endowment at t = 0 is therefore assumed to
be 0. The major difference to the prior section’s model is the fact that agents cannot trade
arbitrary contingent claims for every possible state of the world. In contrast agents trade in
spot markets which are markets for physical commodities which are not contingent on any
future state s. Hence, in the present framework, an agent faces a different budget constraint
for each state s = 1, . . . , S. His consumption in state s is constrained by his endowment and
the payoff generated from his investment portfolio.
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2.2.2 Security Market Equilibrium
A security market equilibrium (SME) is a list
((θ1, c1), . . . , (θI , cI), (q, p))
such that (θi, ci) solves the optimization problem for all i = 1, . . . , I and markets clear, i.e.
I∑
i=1
θin = 0, ∀n (5)
and
I∑
i=1
(cis − ωis) = 0, ∀s (6)
for given prices (q, p). The second condition again states that - in the aggregate - con-
sumption equals supply in each state s. The first condition refers to market clearing for
financial assets. Every asset that is bought by some investor has to be issued by another
one first. Aggregating over all long- and short-positions portfolio holdings must sum to 0,
i.e. securities are “in zero net supply” (see Lengwiler (2006), p. 50).
2.2.3 Deriving a Security Market Equilibrium
Altug and Labadie (2008) normalize the price of the single commodity to ps = 1. Then each
consumer solves
max
ci,θi
S∑
s=1
πs · Ui(cis)
subject to
N∑
n=1
θin · qn ≤ 0
cis ≤ ωis +
N∑
n=1
θin · xn,s, ∀s. (7)
Hence, the Lagrangian equals
L =
S∑
s=1
πs · Ui(cis)− µi ·
N∑
n=1
θin · qn +
S∑
s=1
(
λis · (ωis +
N∑
n=1
θin · xn,s − cis)
)
.
The first-order conditions with respect to the decision variables cis and θ
i are
πs · U ′i(cis) = λis (8)
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µi · qn =
S∑
s=1
λis · xn,s, ∀n (9)
for all s = 1, . . . , S and i = 1, . . . , I. The corresponding market clearing conditions are those
as in equation (5) and (6). Equilibrium allocations and prices can then be derived by first
substituting equation (8) into (9) to obtain
µi · qn =
S∑
s=1
πs · U ′(cis) · xn,s, ∀n. (10)
Goods market clearing suggests that
ωs = c
i
s +
I∑
j=1
j 6=i
cjs.
We also have,
ωs = ω
i
s +
I∑
j=1
j 6=i
ωjs.
Hence, combining both, we can express cis as
cis = ω
i
s +
I∑
j=1
j 6=i
(ωjs − cjs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Aj
with
Aj ≡ −
N∑
n=1
θjn · xn,s.
The latter identity can simply be derived from the budget constraint (7). Substituting cis
into equation (10) we obtain
qn =
S∑
s=1
πs · U ′i(ωis −
∑I
j=1
j 6=i
∑N
n=1 θ
j
n · xn,s) · xn,s
µi
.
The right-hand side (rhs) is strictly increasing in θjn by the same argument provided in the
prior section (see section 2.1.3). By the Implicit Function Theorem we can express portfolio
holdings θin as a function of µ ≡ (µ1, . . . , µI) and q ≡ (q1, . . . , qN ).
θin = g
i
n(µ, q), ∀i
From here we can simply use the security market budget constraint
∑N
n=1 g
i
n(µ, q) · qn = 0
to solve for µi as a function of security prices q, i.e. µi = hi(q). The market clearing
condition for securities
∑I
i=1 g
i
n(h(q), q) = 0 eventually allows us to solve for q with h(q) ≡
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(h1(q), . . . , hI(q)). A major point to consider is the difference between the contingent claims
prices, which are fixed in advance, and security prices in a security market equilibrium.
Since trading takes place before the state s is realized security prices reflect expectations
regarding future payoffs, i.e.
qn =
S∑
s=1
πs · U ′i(cis)
µi
· xn,s.
Each payoff xn,s is discounted by a factor of U
′
i(c
i
s)/µ
i and weighted by the probability
of state s occuring. Finally, one might wonder how both models - the contingent claim
and security market equilibrium - are related. In the contingent claim equilibrium agents
maximize utility subject to a single budget constraint. In contrast to that, in a security
market equilibrium agents face multiple budget constraints, i.e. one for each state. A natural
question that arises in this context is under what conditions both (consumption) allocations
coincide? Arrow (1964) shows that a contingent claims equilibrium can be attained by a
security market equilibrium if the number of states S equals the number of securities N . A
brief summary of these results can be found in Altug and Labadie (2008).
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2.3 A Representative Agent
So far we have allowed for ex ante heterogeneity among the members of a set of individual
agents. As demonstrated in the previous sections one would have to solve the optimization
problem for all agents simultaneously. For a population of multiple agents it may therefore
seem plausible to derive equilibrium allocations and prices by means of one representative
agent. This idea can simply “be justified by the fact that, in a competitive equilibrium
with complete securities markets there is an especially intuitive sense of a representative
agent: one whose utility function is a weighted average of the utilities of the various agents
in the economy” (see Danthine and Donaldson (2005), p. 162). Representative agents
are a powerful tool to deal with the complex issue of aggregation especially when there is
heterogeneity among agents in a population. The circumstances under which a representative
agents exists are evaluated in this section.
2.3.1 Constructing a Representative Agent
Suppose we are in a one-period contingent claim economy with agents i = 1, . . . , I choosing
state contingent consumption cis for period t = 1 (same setup as before). There is only one
perishable consumption good and cis, ps ∈ R+. The procedure that I am presenting here
is based on a central result which is closely related to the second theorem of welfare. One
can show that for every pareto optimal allocation there exists a set of non-negative numbers
{λi}Ii=1 such that the same allocation can be achieved by a central planner who maximizes a
linear combination of individual utility functions using {λi}Ii=1 as weights (see Varian (1992),
pp. 329 and Huang and Litzenberger (1988) ch. 5). We will derive conditions under which
the central planner and individual optimization problems deliver the same equilibrium. The
central planner maximizes
max
I∑
i=1
λi ·
[
S∑
s=1
πs · Ui(cis)
]
where πs denotes the probability of state s occuring and Ui denotes the utility function
of agent i over cis. Assuming that utility is strictly increasing, the weights λi are strictly
positive, i.e.
λi > 0, ∀i.
Since individuals may at most consume the available aggregate consumption level one has
to impose the following budget constraint:
I∑
i=1
cis = Cs, ∀s
where Cs denotes aggregate consumption in state s. Taking this constraint into account one
can set up the Lagrangian
13
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max
cis
L =
I∑
i=1
λi ·
[
S∑
s=1
πs · Ui(cis)
]
+
S∑
s=1
φs ·
[
Cs −
I∑
i=1
cis
]
. (11)
The FOC then is
∂L
∂cis
= λiπs · ∂Ui(c
i
s)
∂cis
− φs = 0, ∀i, ∀s. (12)
Accordingly, the optimization problem of an individual agent i then is
max
S∑
s=1
πs · Ui(cis)
subject to
S∑
s=1
ps · cis =
S∑
s=1
ps · ωis
where ps denotes the price of a claim on one unit of consumption in state s and ω
i
s denotes
the endowment of agent i in state s. The Lagrangian is
max
cis
L =
S∑
s=1
πs · Ui(cis) + ψi ·
[
S∑
s=1
psω
i
s − pscis
]
(13)
with ψi > 0, ∀i. The corresponding FOC then is
∂L
∂cis
= πs · ∂Ui(c
i
s)
∂cis
− ψi · ps = 0, ∀s. (14)
By setting φs = ps and λi = ψ
−1
i the optimality conditions for a single agent (see equation
(14)) and a central planner (see equation (12)) are equivalent. Henceforth, a central planner
who wants to achieve the same pareto optimal allocation as if households optimized indi-
vidually would have to assign a weight of ψ−1i to individual i. This result has an intuitive
economic interpretation. From equation (13) we get that the parameter ψi is the Lagrangian
multiplier with respect to the budget constraint. Furthermore, since such multipliers are
interpreted as shadow prices, an agent i’s weight λi is equal to the inverse of this shadow
price obviously. From equation (14) one can spot that the product of shadow price ψi and
the price of a claim in state s equals the marginal utility of consumption contingent on state
s, i.e. an agent i is considered important when λi is large which is equivalent to ψi being
small (and hence marginal utility in state s being small). Since marginal utility is small
when consumption is high, a high weight λi corresponds to an “important” agent which
makes sense intuitively. This derivation, however, only works when markets are complete.
A market is considered complete when a complete set of state contingent claims exist. Prices
of such claims are referred to as state prices. Why is market completeness required? In order
to value endowments one needs a state price vector of consumption claims. Although such
a vector exists in both, complete and incomplete markets, it is only unique in complete
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markets. Hence, different state prices imply different representative agents leading the idea
of one representative agent ad absurdum.
Now that we have derived conditions under which a representative agent exists one can
construct the representative agent as follows: Define
Ur(x) ≡ max
{xi}Ii=1
I∑
i=1
λi · Ui(xi) (15)
subject to
I∑
i=1
xi = x
with λi = ψ
−1
i being the weight that the central planner assigns to an agent i. Taking the
first derivative of this function with respect to aggregate consumption Cs yields
∂Ur(Cs)
∂Cs
= U ′r(Cs) =
I∑
i=1
λi · U ′i(cis) ·
∂cis
∂Cs
=
I∑
i=1
λi · ψi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
· ps
πs
· ∂c
i
s
∂Cs
=
ps
πs
with
I∑
i=1
∂cis
∂Cs
= 1.
The product λi · ψi is trivially equal to 1 since λi = ψ−1i . Similarly, the partial derivatives
of cis with respect to Cs adds up to 1 trivially. The reason is intuitive. When aggregate
consumption increases by one unit each agent i retains his share in that additional unit.
Thus, the sum of these shares must add up to a total of 1. Finally, to show the existence
of a representative agent, let Cs, ∀s denote the representative agents initial endowment in
state s. Let πs denote its subjective probability of state s and let utility be denoted by
Ur(Cs). To show the existence of the representative agent we will derive that state prices
of consumption claims equal ps. Since we are in a representative agent economy no trading
occurs, i.e. prices must be such that the representative agent never wants to trade. In
equilibrium the representative agent’s marginal utility of consumption contingent on state
s πs · U ′r(Cs) must be equal to the state price ps of the consumption claim. The agent will
“buy” claims as long as ps < πs · U ′r(Cs) and “sell” them as long as ps > πs · U ′r(Cs). From
U ′r(Cs) = ps/πs we trivially get
πs · U ′r(Cs) = πs ·
ps
πs
= ps.
Hence, the representative agent’s marginal utility equals state prices and therefore our rep-
resentative agent exists.
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2.4 The Lucas Model and CCAPM
The following section will introduce the consumption-based capital asset pricing model based
on the papers of Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979). The setup comprises a simple pure
endowment economy and a representative agent who dynamically optimizes equity portfolio-
as well as consumption allocations. We will therefore use a recursive equilibrium approach.
Recursive methods first appeared in the works of Wald (1945), Bellman (1957) and Kalman
(1960) and provide the necessary tools to study and analyze dynamic economic systems. A
comprehensive summary of the latest methods is the book of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).
2.4.1 Model and Assumptions
As in the previous chapters we study a pure endowment economy with a representative
agent, a single, perishable consumption good and n distinct production units. Our aim is
to derive fundamental pricing functions for risky assets. With the equity premium puzzle in
mind our focus will therefore be on the pricing of equity securities.
We will begin by describing the stochastic nature of the output process. In each period
n exogenous shocks st affect the output process yt where yt =
∑n
i=1 yi,t. The component
yi,t refers to the output of unit i in period t. Let st ∈ S ⊂ Rn where S is assumed to be
compact3. The shocks st follow a Markov process with transition function φ. The transition
function is a mapping φ : S × S → [0, 1] such that
φ(s, s′) ≡ Prob(st+1 ≤ s′|st = s)
and can be interpreted as assigning probabilities to certain shocks s′ occuring in period t+1
given that s occured in the prior period. It possesses the Feller property (assumption a), i.e.
for any bounded and continuous function h : S → R the term ∫ h(s′) dφ(s, s′) is continuous
in s (see Lucas (1978), p. 1431). The process generated by the transition function φ has a
stationary distribution Φ (see mathematical appendix A.1 for details). Output is modelled
as a function of the shocks
yt ≡ y(st)
which is invariant with respect to time. Since the shock process st follows a first-order
Markov process the output process is of the same kind. Furthermore, we assume that the
output process takes only positive values in a compact set. Let
Y ≡ [y, y]
with y > 0 being a lower bound and y <∞ an upper bound. Hence, the mapping y : S → Y
is continuous and “bounded away from zero” (assumption b) (see Altug and Labadie (2008),
3In a real vector space this is equivalent to being closed and bounded by the Heine-Borel Theorem.
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p. 163)4. Let {ct}∞t=0 be a sequence of consumptions. Preferences of the representative
agent are given by
E0
{
∞∑
t=0
βt · U(ct)
}
(16)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor and E0 is an expected value operator conditional on in-
formation avaiable at t = 0. Preferences are assumed to be additively separable with respect
to consumption across time. Let U : R+ → R+ denote a strictly concave and strictly increas-
ing C2 function representing preferences over consumption with Inada conditions U(0) = 0
and limc→0 U
′(c) = ∞ (assumption c). The latter assumption makes sure that we obtain
an interior solution of the maximization problem (see Danthine and Donaldson (2005), p.
166).
The shares traded in our economy are claims on the output process. Let qt = (q1,t, . . . , qn,t) ∈
R
n
+ denote the price vector of a share ex dividend, i.e. after dividends have been paid. By
zt = (z1,t, . . . , zn,t) ∈ Rn+ we denote the beginning-of-period share holdings. Each outstand-
ing equity share is assumed to be perfectly divisible. The budget constraint faced by the
representative agent in each period t equals
ct + qt · zt+1 ≤ (yt + qt) · zt (17)
for all t = 0, 1, . . . . Period t consumption ct can then be interpreted as the difference
between total output yt
5 plus the total value of financial assets qt · zt held in period t and
the value of financial assets qt ·zt+1 carried forward to period t+1 such that “the rhs finances
the lhs”. The initial share holdings z0 are taken as given. Trading in financial markets in
any period t only takes place after the corresponding realized output yt has been observed
for that period. The agent chooses sequences for consumption and equity so as to maximize
equation (16) subject to the budget constraint (17) and the following
ct ≥ 0
0 ≤ zt+1 ≤ z, z ≫ e
for all t where e ≡ (1, . . . 1) is an n-element vector of ones. Sequences for equity prices are
taken as given. Market clearing holds when
ct = yt
zt+1 = e
4Lucas (1978) expresses this condition as φ(y, 0) = 0, i.e. for a given y the next period’s realization of
the process can never equal 0.
5Total output yt equals total dividends paid. There are no retained earnings.
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for all t. The first condition simply states that the whole output is consumed (the con-
sumption good is perishable and cannot be stored). The second one implies security market
clearing, i.e. all shares are held by the representative agent.
2.4.2 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
In the following we will show the existence of a recursive competitive equilibrium, i.e. we
will establish a functional relationship between asset prices and the exogenously determined
production shocks that affect output. As stated previously, total output equals total con-
sumption in an equilibrium allocation. For any equilibrium allocation the agent’s expected
utility must therefore be finite (bounded). Consider the following:
Lemma 2.1 Under assumptions a–c, for any consumption sequence {ct}∞t=0 with ct ≤ yt,
we have
E0
{
∞∑
t=0
βt · U(ct)
}
≤ B <∞.
Proof In the prior section we made sure that output takes values in a compact set by
defining Y ≡ [y, y]. Thus, consumption can be chosen such that ct ∈ [0, y] with yt ≤ y.
Thus, under the continuous mapping U(.) the image of a compact domain is again compact.
Hence, total utility is bounded, i.e.
B ≡
∞∑
t=0
βt · U(y) = 1
1− β · U(y) <∞.

The agent’s problem may then be formulated as a stationary dynamic programming problem.
The relevant state variables are the number of shares z and the exogenous shock parameter s.
The aim is to maximize expected utility subject to a budget constraint and market-clearing
conditions. Let v denote the value function. The price function
q : S → Rn+
is assumed to be given by the agent. The dynamic optimization problem can then be
formulated recursively as
v(z, s) = max
c,z′
{
U(c) + β ·
∫
v(z′, s′) dφ(s, s′)
}
(18)
subject to
c+ q · z′ ≤ (y + q) · z (19)
c ≥ 0, z′ ∈ Z. (20)
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where z′ ∈ Z ⇔ 0 ≤ z′i ≤ zi for all i = 1, . . . , n. Variables with a prime superscript denote
future states and those without prime denote present states6. The relevant choice variables
are current state consumption c and the future allocation of financial assets z′. A recursive
competitive equilibrium can then be defined as follows:
Definition A recursive competitive equilibrium is a price function q : S → Rn+ and a value
function v : Z × S → R+ such that (i) given q(s), v(z, s) solves the agent’s optimization
problem and (ii) markets clear.
Since we are in a representative agent economy one has to introduce the notion of a so
called no trade equilibrium. In a multi-agent economy one obtains an equilibrium when
supply equals demand, i.e. for a given price some agents are willing to sell exactly what
others are willing to buy. A representative agent does not have any trading counterparts.
Hence, a no trade equilibrium is characerized in such a way that supply equals demand and
both are at the same time equal to zero. At the equilibrium price the agent is thus willing
to own all shares outstanding. “Therefore the essential question being asked is: What prices
must securities assume so that the amount the representative agent must hold (for all markets
to clear) exactly equals what he wants to hold” (see Danthine and Donaldson (2005), p. 154).
In what follows, a proof of the existence of the value function v(.) will be given. The
relevant mathematical preliminaries can be found in the appendix (see section A.3). Let the
price function q(s) be given. Let S ≡ Z × S. S is then a compact set being the cartesian
product of compact sets. Let C(S) be the space of bounded, continuous functions v : S → R+
equipped with the supremums norm
‖u‖ ≡ sup
z,s∈S
|u(z, s)|, ∀u ∈ C(S)
so that we have, in fact, a complete metric space such that every Cauchy sequence (of
functions) converges to an element in that space (see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), p.
926).
Theorem 2.2 For any given continuous price function q(s) there exists a unique, bounded,
continuous and nonnegative solution v∗ ∈ C(S) to the functional equation defined by (18).
The function v∗ is concave and increasing in z.
Proof Let v ∈ C(S) and define an operator T
Tv(z, s) = max
c,z′
{
U(c) + β ·
∫
v(z′, s′) dφ(s, s′)
}
subject to (19) and (20). The sets Y, S and Z are compact by assumption. The utility
function U is also continuous by assumption as is v since v ∈ C(S). Hence, maximizing a
6The recursive nature of the problem allows us to drop the time indices, since the optimization problem
is reduced to a two-period framework “today and tomorrow”.
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continuous real-valued function v over a compact set S yields a maximum. Furthermore,
both, U and v, are bounded. Hence, Tv is bounded and it is continuous as the sum of
continuous functions is again continuous. T is then a mapping, T : C(S) → C(S), which
maps the space of continuous, bounded functions into itself. To show that T is indeed a
contraction mapping one has to prove themonotonicity and discounting properties (Blackwell
conditions) (see A.5). Let u,w ∈ C(S) with u ≥ w, ∀z, s ∈ S. Hence,
Tu = max
c,z′
{
U(c) + β ·
∫
u(z′, s′) dφ(s, s′)
}
≥ max
c,z′
{
U(c) + β ·
∫
w(z′, s′) dφ(s, s′)
}
= Tw
(21)
establishing the argument. The discounting property is easily verfied as follows: Let k be
an arbitrary constant. Then
T (v + k) = max
c,z′
{
U(c) + β ·
∫
[v(z′, s′) + k] dφ(s, s′)
}
= max
c,z′
{
U(c) + β ·
∫
v(z′, s′) dφ(s, s′)
}
+ β · k
= Tv + β · k
and T satisfies the Blackwell conditions. Having shown that T is, in fact, a contraction
mapping and considering that C(S) is a complete, normed, linear space then T has a unique
fixed point and limn→∞ T
nv0 = v
∗ for any v0 ∈ C(S) by the contraction mapping theorem
(see A.2).
What remains to be shown is that v∗ is increasing and concave. Let C′(S) ⊂ C(S) be
the subspace of continuous, bounded, increasing and concave real-valued functions equipped
with the supremums norm. C′(S) is a closed, complete, normed, linear space. Let w ∈ C′(S).
Since w is increasing in z we have w(z1, s) < w(z2, s) for z1 < z2
7. Since T satisfies the
Blackwell conditions this implies Tw(z1, s) < Tw(z2, s). Finally, one has to show that T
preserves concavity. Let z0, z1 ∈ Z be arbitrary share allocations and c0, c1 ∈ Y be arbitrary
consumptions. Let α ∈ [0, 1], zα = α · z0 + (1− α) · z1 and cα = α · c0 + (1− α) · c1. Since
(ci, z
′
i) is a feasible allocation for i = 0, 1 any convex combination of them must also be
feasible. Hence, (cα, z
′
α) satisfies (17). Tw(zi, s) is attained at (ci, z
′
i) for i = 0, 1. Then
7The subscripts denote an index i for a whole vector z and do not refer to the i-th element of vector z.
20
2.4 The Lucas Model and CCAPM Equity Premium Puzzle
Tw(zα, s) ≥ U(cα) + β ·
∫
w(z′α, s
′) dφ(s, s′)
≥ α · U(c0) + (1− α) · U(c1) + α · β ·
∫
w(z′0, s
′) dφ(s, s′)
+ (1− α) · β ·
∫
w(z′1, s
′) dφ(s, s′)
= α ·
[
U(c0) + β ·
∫
w(z′0, s
′) dφ(s, s′)
]
+ (1− α) ·
[
U(c1) + β ·
∫
w(z′1, s
′) dφ(s, s′)
]
≥ α · Tw(z0, s) + (1− α) · Tw(z1, s).
Since U and w are concave by assumption the second inequality must hold. Tw(zi, s) is
attained at (ci, z
′
i) for i = 0, 1. Hence, we can factor out α and (1−α) respectively to obtain
the third inequality. Eventually, putting together the fact that T is a contraction mapping
on C(S) and T (C′(S)) ⊆ C′(S) we must have v∗ ∈ C′(S) by corollary A.3 (see Lucas (1978),
p. 1432–1433). 
Hence, a solution to the consumers constrained optimization problem exists for a given price
function q. So far we proved the existence of a value function v given the respective pricing
function q. In the following, we will show the existence of the pricing function q for equities
given that v exists. A proof regarding the differentiability of v is shown in Lucas (1978) (p.
1433–1434) and will be omitted here. The overall approach to follow is very similar to the
one previously taken for v. Using the objective function (18), the budget constraint (19)
and a Lagrange multiplier λ(s) one can set up the Lagrangian
L = U(c) + β ·
∫
v(z′, s′) dφ(s, s′)
+
∫
λ(s) ·
(
y · z − c+ q · z − q · z′
)
dφ(s, s′).
where y = (y1, . . . , yn)
8 for convenience. The FOC with respect to c and z′ are then
∂L
∂c
= U ′(c)− λ(s) = 0
and
∂L
∂z′i
= β ·
∫
∂v(z′, s′)
∂z′i
dφ(s, s′)− λ(s) · qi = 0, ∀i
The envelope conditions, which are the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to
the parameter z, equal
8yi denotes the output of unit i.
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∂L
∂zi
= λ(s) · (yi + qi) = ∂v(z, s)
∂zi
, ∀i.
The latter equality holds by Lucas (1978) (see proposition 2, p. 1433–1434). Let c∗(z, s)
and z∗(z, s) denote the equilibrium solutions of the policy functions of the Bellman equation
(18). From the market clearing conditions one then gets in equilibrium c∗(1, s) = y(s) (total
output is consumed) and z∗(1, s) = e (all shares are held). Combining the first order- and
envelope conditions one can derive the intertemporal Euler equations which are
U ′(y) · qi = β ·
∫
U ′(y′) · [y′i + (qi)′] dφ(s, s′)
= β ·
∫
U ′(y′) · y′i dφ(s, s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡γi(s)
+ β ·
∫
U ′(y′) · (qi)′︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ξi(s′)
dφ(s, s′), ∀i.
(22)
As in the previous section one can then prove the existence and uniqueness of a pricing
function qi given the value function v for all i = 1, . . . n. Again, let C(S) denote the space
of bounded and continuous functions ξi : S → R+ equipped with the supremums norm for
all i = 1, . . . , n. Let the mapping γi : S → R+ be defined as
γi(s) ≡ β ·
∫
U ′(y′) · y′i dφ(s, s′), ∀i. (23)
In addition to that, let ξi(s) ≡ U ′(y) · qi and Ti be an operator such that
Tiξi(s) = γi(s) + β ·
∫
ξi(s
′) dφ(s, s′), ∀i. (24)
Above equation resembles the problem studied in the previous section (see equation (18)).
Hence, we can formulate:
Theorem 2.3 There exists a unique, bounded and continuous solution ξ∗i to Tiξi = ξi for
all i = 1, . . . , n. For any ξ0i ∈ C(S) we have limn→∞ Tni ξ0i = ξ∗i .
Proof The proof works in a similar fashion as the proof of theorem 2.2. Our aim is to show
that Ti is a contraction mapping. The following arguments always hold for all i = 1, . . . , n.
We will first show that the rhs of (24) is bounded and continuous. γi(s) is bounded by
the following: Since U ′ > 0 and yi > 0, we must have γi > 0. By definition y (aggregate
output) takes values in a compact set Y. Since U(.) is continuous and the domain space Y
is compact the image of Y under U must also be compact. Hence, U(.) is bounded and it is
concave by assumption. Thus, the following must hold
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U(y)− U(0) ≥ U ′(y) · (y − 0) = U ′(y) · y − U ′(y) · 0 = U ′(y) · y
Economically, this can be interpreted as “average utility exceeds marginal utility” (see Varian
(1992), p. 489). Hence, U ′(y) · yi ≤ U, ∀y ∈ Y (this must hold since yi ≤ y) and therefore
γi(s) = β ·
∫
U ′(y′) · y′i dφ(s, s′) ≤ β · U,
i.e. a weighted average of bounded functions is again bounded. By the Feller property
(see assumption a on page 16) the rhs of equation (23) is continuous. Hence, the function
Ti : C(S) → C(S) is a mapping from the space of bounded and continuous functions into
itself. Obviously, Ti satisfies the monotonicity property . Let νi ∈ C(S) such that νi(s) ≥
ξi(s), ∀s ∈ S, then Tiνi(s) ≥ Tiξi(s), ∀s ∈ S (see previous result on page 20). The
discounting property is also easily verified as before. Let k be an arbitrary constant. Then,
Ti(ξi + k)(s) = γi(s) + β ·
∫
[ξi(s
′) + k] dφ(s, s′)
= Tiξi(s) + β · k
and we can concluded that Ti is, in fact, a contraction mapping defined on the a complete,
linear and normed space of functions. By the contraction mapping theorem A.2 ξ∗i is a
unique fixed point in C(S). 
Having defined the identity ξi ≡ U ′(y) · qi earlier one can then solve for the equity price as
qi(s) =
ξ∗i (s)
U ′(y(s))
. (25)
Hence, we obtain a unique equilibrium pricing function q(s) = (q1(s), . . . , qn(s)). Asset
prices thus depend on the output/consumption process as well as the shape of the utility
function.
2.4.3 Asset Pricing Functions
Having established the existence and uniqueness of the value function v and the equity price
function q in the previous section, we will now proceed to derive an explicit expression for
the yet to be determined asset pricing function ξ∗. In contrast to the prior section we will
do this for a simplified framework in which there is only one production unit and hence only
one equity share (see Lucas (1978), p. 1439). It follows trivially that individual production
therefore always equals aggregate production. For that purpose it is assumed that the shocks
st ∈ R are independently and identically distributed (iid), i.e. every realization of the shock
has the same probability distribution and realizations are independent of each other. Since
output is a function of the shock parameters, {yt}∞t=0 is a sequence of iid random variables.
Let Φ(y) denote the cumulative distribution function of the stationary output process. The
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intertemporal Euler equation (22) can then be written as
U ′(y) · q = β ·
∫ [
U ′(y′) · [y′ + q′] dΦ(y′)
]
= β ·
∫
U ′(y′) · y′ dΦ(y′) + β ·
∫
U ′(y′) · q′ dΦ(y′)
(26)
which is the function to be solved for q. Let
ξ ≡ β ·
∫
U ′(y′) · y′ dΦ(y′) = β ·E[U ′(y′) · y′] (27)
be constant and define
ξn(y) = Tξn−1(y) = ξ + β ·
∫
ξn−1(y
′) dΦ(y′)
with
ξ(y) = U ′(y) · q(y). (28)
Since T is, in fact, a contraction mapping we have a converging sequence of functions
ξn(y) → ξ∗(y) for any ξ0(y) ∈ C(S). Suppose ξ0(y) = 0. By repeated substitution we
get
ξ1 = Tξ0 = ξ + β ·
∫
0 dΦ(y′) = ξ
ξ2 = Tξ1 = ξ + β ·
∫
ξ dΦ(y′) = ξ · (1 + β)
...
ξn = Tξn−1 = ξ + β ·
∫
ξ · (1 + β + . . .+ βn−2) dΦ(y′)
= ξ · (1 + β + . . .+ βn−1) = ξ ·
n−1∑
j=0
βj
.
More generally, one can express ξn = T
nξ0 (see proof of theorem A.2). Hence, in the limit,
we get
24
2.4 The Lucas Model and CCAPM Equity Premium Puzzle
ξ∗ = lim
n→∞
Tnξ0
= lim
n→∞
ξ ·
n−1∑
i=0
βi = ξ · 1
1− β .
Resubstituting the relevant expressions for ξ∗ (25) and ξ (27) we get
U ′(y) · q = β
1− β ·E[U
′(y′) · y′].
The sensitivity of equity prices with respect to output can be determined as follows: Differ-
entiating equation (28) with respect to y yields
∂q
∂y
=
ξ∗′ · U ′(y)− U ′′(y) · ξ∗
U ′(y)2
= −U
′′(y) · ξ∗
U ′(y)2
= − U
′′(y)
U ′(y)2
· β ·E[U
′(y′) · y′]
1− β
= −q · U
′′(y)
U ′(y)
> 0
. (29)
The second equality of the first line must hold since ξ∗ is a constant. In the final line q is
substituted for β · E[U ′(y′) · y′]/[(1 − β) · U ′(y)]. Since the utility function is assumed to
be concave we have U ′′(y) < 0 and the whole last expression is positive. Equation (29) can
then be rearranged to state
y · q′
q
= −y · U
′′(y)
U ′(y)
(30)
such that the income elasticity of equity prices equals the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative
risk aversion (where q′ = ∂q/∂y). Agents attempting to transfer part of their income into
the future must therefore hold securities since the consumption good is perishable. Hence,
due to the higher demand for equities, share prices must increase (see Lucas (1978), p. 1439).
2.4.4 Interest Rates, Risk Corrections and the Risk Premium
In what follows we will derive explicit functions for the equity risk premium. For that
purpose, we will reformulate equation (26) as
U ′(yt) · qt = Et
[
β · U ′(yt+1) · (yt+1 + qt+1)
]
(31)
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where U ′(yt) · qt denotes the loss in utility if an agent subsitutes share purchases for con-
sumption while the rhs equals the discounted utility gain obtained from investing in period
t and subsequent consumption in period t+ 1. Above equation is equivalent to
1 = Et
[
β · U
′(yt+1)
U ′(yt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡mt+1
· yt+1 + qt+1
qt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Rt+1
]
= Et[mt+1 ·Rt+1] (32)
where mt+1 is a stochastic discount factor
9 and Rt+1 is the real return on equity. The
pricing kernel clearly reflects the time preferences of households as well as the desire to have
smooth consumption paths. Equation (32) is the fundamental asset pricing equation since
it is the starting point for a couple of important conclusions regarding interest rates, risk
corrections and equity premia (see Cochrane (2005), p. 14ff.). In order to derive a premium
we have to relate equity returns to a reference return such as the return of risk-free bonds.
In the present case we assume that these risk-free bonds yield a payoff of 1 with certainty
at the end of a period. Hence, equation (32) reduces to
pbt = Et[mt+1 · 1]
where pbt denotes the bond price in period t and 1 is a certain payoff in t+ 1. The risk-free
return can then be expressed as
Rrft =
1
pbt
=
1
Et[mt+1]
. (33)
Since a risk-free asset is not traded in our model economy Rrf is also referred to as a
“shadow” risk-free rate (see Cochrane (2005), p. 20). To establish a relationship between
the risk-free rate and other model parameters we will assume the following: The utility
function U is represented by a power utility function with the constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) property of the form
U(yt) =


y
1−γ
t
1−γ if γ 6= 1
ln(yt) if γ = 1
where γ denotes the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. The latter can be shown
by plugging our specification of the utility function into the rhs of (30). Above utility
function is the function of choice in a wide spectrum of areas including growth theory and
real business cycles since it is scale-invariant and allows for a representative agent. However,
an important implication of such preferences is that agents smoothing consumption across
states also do so across time. There is no economic intuition as to why this should be the
case (see Mehra (2008), p. 14). Hence, if there is no uncertainty about future consumption
yt+1, we can express the risk-free interest rate as
9mt+1 is also often referred to as a pricing kernel or the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of
consumption (MRS).
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Rrft =
1
β
·
(
yt+1
yt
)γ
(34)
implying the following. Interest rates are high when 1/β is high, i.e. when β is low. Thus,
interest rates are positively correlated with high impatience. Higher savings can only be
effected when rates are large enough to convince agents to save more. Furthermore, interest
rates are high when yt+1/yt is high, i.e. when consumption growth is high. High interest
rates attract increased savings today and thus shift consumption from today into the future.
Hence, consumption growth rates are high. A large risk aversion coefficient γ implies that
consumers prefer a smooth consumption stream over time. Hence, interest rates must be
high to attract increased savings when the curvature of the utility function is large. This
can easily be seen from the first derivative of Rrf with respect to consumption growth which
is
∂Rrft
∂
(
yt+1
yt
) = γ
β
·
(
yt+1
yt
)γ−1
.
To account for the fact that there is uncertainty about future consumption (as is the case for
the Lucas model) one has to make the following adaptations: Suppose that zt+1 ≡ yt+1/yt
is log-normally distributed such that ln(zt+1) is normally distributed. Thus,
∆ ln yt+1 = ln yt+1 − ln yt ∼ N (gz, σ2z)
and
Et[zt+1] = e
gz+0.5·σ
2
z ⇔ lnEt[zt+1] = gz + 0.5 · σ2z .
Let rl,rft ≡ lnRrft and β ≡ e−δ. Analogous to equation (34) we then get
Rrft = Et
[
1
β
·
(yt+1
yt
)γ]
= Et
[
e−δ·e−γ·∆ ln yt+1
]−1
=
[
e−δ·e−γ·Et[∆ ln yt+1]+0.5·γ2·σ2(∆ ln yt+1)
]−1
.
Hence, by taking logarithms we obtain
rl,rft = δ + γ · gz − 0.5 · γ2 · σ2z .
We can basically draw the same conclusions as in the prior case with uncertainty. When δ is
large (which is equivalent to β being low and hence high impatience) interest rates are high.
Interest rates are also high when expected consumption growth gz is high. Furthermore,
when γ is large (strong curvature of the utility function) interest rates must be large to
convince agents to increase savings. The last term captures what is known as precautionary
saving. When consumption is subject to high volatility agents want to insure themselves
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against large fluctuations in consumption by saving more. Hence, interest rates will be lower.
In a final step we will determine return premia based on the notion of risk corrections. Let
xt+1 ≡ yt+1 + qt+1 denote the payoff of an asset in period t+ 1. Equation (32) can then be
written as
qt = Et[mt+1] ·Et[xt+1] + covt[mt+1, xt+1]
=
Et[xt+1]
Rrft
+ covt[mt+1, xt+1]
=
Et[xt+1]
Rrft
+
covt[β · U ′(yt+1), xt+1]
U ′(yt)
. (35)
The first term equals the present value of payoff xt+1 in a risk-neutral world (no uncertainty
about consumption or risk-neutral (linear) utility). The second term captures a risk pre-
mium that is due to the covariation between the asset’s payoff and the stochastic discount
factor (see Cochrane (2005), p. 23). The implications of (35) are more than obvious. The
larger the covariance between an asset’s payoff xt+1 and the stochastic discount factor mt+1
the higher are asset prices. Since U ′(y) is large when y is small one can conclude that a
negative correlation between the payoff of an asset and consumption leads to higher prices.
The reasoning behind this is intuitive. As agents want to have smooth consumption paths
they will avoid those assets that yield high payoffs during good times and low payoffs in
recessionary periods. Hence, for such assets to be attractive, prices must be comparatively
low. Since we are interested in returns we can rearrange above equation to state
1 = Et[mt+1 ·Rt+1]
=
Et[Rt+1]
Rrft
+ covt[mt+1, Rt+1]
(36)
which in turn is equivalent to
Et[Rt+1]−Rrft = −Rrft · covt[mt+1, Rt+1]
= −σt(mt+1) · σt(Rt+1)
Et(mt+1)
· corrt(mt+1, Rt+1). (37)
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Since mt+1 = β · U
′(yt+1)
U ′(yt)
we get
Et[Rt+1]−Rrft = −
σt(mt+1) · σt(Rt+1)
β
U ′(yt)
·Et[U ′(yt+1)]
·
β
U ′(yt)
· covt[U ′(yt+1), Rt+1]
σt(mt+1) · σt(Rt+1)
= −covt[U
′(yt+1), Rt+1]
Et[U ′(yt+1)]
(38)
Equation (38) relates the excess return on a risky asset with reference to the risk-free return
to the covariance of the risky return with the marginal utility of consumption in t + 1.
The rhs is therefore the equity premium. The premium is obviously high when the rhs
of (38) is larger than 0 which is the case when future returns Rt+1 and marginal utility
U ′(yt+1) are negatively correlated. Hence, an asset is considered risky when low asset
returns coincide with low consumption and income levels. Such an asset will only be held
when its return is relatively high. Altug and Labadie (2008) term those assets ideal that
yield high returns during recessionary periods when consumption is low (and hence the
covariance between returns and the marginal utility of t+ 1 consumption is positive). The
resulting negative equity premium can then be viewed as some sort of insurance premium
against negative income shocks. Finally, one important aspect to note is the following: Only
such risk is rewarded that originates from the covariance between returns and consumption.
Idiosyncratic risk that is specific for each individual asset is not rewarded even if it is
large, i.e. when an asset’s payoff is subject to large variability, but is uncorrelated with the
stochastic discount factor. The decomposition of a payoff into its idiosyncratic (uncorrelated
with m) and systematic part (correlated with m) can be done by means of a projection of
x on m. The price of the resulting residual component (idiosyncratic part) must then be 0
(see Cochrane (2005), p. 25).
2.5 Summary
In the previous chapter a basic introduction into general equilibrium asset pricing was pro-
vided. The first section introduces the most basic notion of an asset pricing framework in
the form of a contingent claim economy in which agents may trade contracts that yield a
certain payoff conditional on a certain state occuring. Using simple Lagrange optimization
methods one can show the existence of a price vector that satisfies market clearing as well
as utility maximization for individual agents. In the following part we extended this model
to an asset economy in which agents trade in physical commodity markets and financial
markets reflecting an overall more realistic framework. Section 2.3 then provides a short
introduction to a so called representative agent. Representative agent models are a powerful
tool to aggregate a homogeneous population of economic agents into one single agent. One
of the most important representative agent models in the field of financial economics is the
consumption-based approach developed by Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979). The Lucas
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tree model provides an elementary framework to investigate the behavior of asset prices in
a simple pure endowment economy in which production is subject to exogeneous random
shocks. By means of a dynamic programming approach one can prove the existence of a
recursive competitive equilibrium which is simply a pair of functions, i.e. a value function v
and an asset pricing function q. Starting from the fundamental asset pricing equation one
can derive important implications regarding the economics of interest rates, risk corrections
and the equity premium.
3 The Equity Premium Puzzle
3.1 Theory of the Equity Premium Puzzle
Prescott and Mehra (1985) based their seminal paper on the contribution of Lucas (1978)
and Breeden (1979) to come up with what is widely known as the equity premium puzzle. The
equity premium refers to the return of risky assets earned in excess of a risk-free reference
rate. In the following chapter we will provide a theoretical evaluation of the equity premium
implied by an adapted Lucas tree economy. Furthermore, an additional view on the puzzle
will be provided based on the paper of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991). The major point
of interest in Prescott and Mehra (1985) is whether the large return spread between equities
and default-free debt can be accounted for by standard economic models that abstract from
market frictions such as transaction costs, liquidity constraints, taxes and regulation and
the like. Their initial guess was “that most likely some equilibrium model with a friction will
be the one that successfully accounts for the large average equity premium” (see Prescott and
Mehra (1985), p. 146).
3.1.1 Model and Assumptions
The basic setup is very similar to the one described in section 2.4.1. To account for the
fact that per capita consumption has grown over time Prescott and Mehra (1985) model the
growth rate of consumption as a Markov process in contrast to the Lucas tree model where
the level of consumption follows a Markov process. The only consumer in the model is a
representative agent with preferences of the form
E0
{
∞∑
t=0
βt · U(yt)
}
, 0 < β < 1,
where E0 is an expectation operator, β denotes the time discount factor, yt refers to con-
sumption in period t and U : R+ → R is a concave utility function satisfying the Inada
conditions with the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) property. It takes the form
U(yt) =


y
1−γ
t
1−γ if γ 6= 1
ln(yt) if γ = 1
(39)
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where γ denotes the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion measuring the curvature
of the function (see page 27). The advantages and disadvantages of such preferences have
already been discussed in section 2.4.4. Furthermore, we consider one single production
unit producing a single, perishable good. Hence, there is only one equity share outstanding
representing a claim on the output process {y}∞t=0 whose return equals the market return
trivially. The growth rate of production is assumed to follow a Markov process since we
try to capture the growth pattern of consumption observed empirically (see above). A
comprehensive treatment of this altered modeling framework can be found in Mehra (1988).
Under the assumption of nonstationary consumption we thus have
yt+1 = yt · zt+1
where zt+1 denotes the growth rate of production between period t and t + 1 and zt+1 ∈
{g1, . . . , gn}, i.e. the growth rate can take on finitely many values. Additionally, let
φ(gi, gj) ≡ Prob(zt+1 = gj |zt = gi)
with transition matrix Π and gi > 0, ∀i10 as well as y0 > 0, i.e. initial production is positive.
Furthermore, the Markov chain is assumed to be ergodic, i.e. it is possible to move from
an arbitrary state to any other state. An ergodic chain is also recurrent, aperiodic and
irreducible. In simple terms recurrence means that once the state has been j the system will
return to this state at some future point with certainty. Aperiodicity implies that any state
j may occur irregularly while irreducibility simply says that any state j may be accessed
from any other state. Security prices are quoted ex dividend as before. Furthermore, the
authors assume that the matrix A with entries
ai,j ≡ β · φi,j · g1−γj , ∀i, j = 1, . . . , n (40)
is stable, i.e. limAm = 0 as m → ∞. This is a necessary condition for expected utility
to exist when the representative household consumes yt in every period (see Prescott and
Mehra (1985), p. 151). In what follows we will derive a basic set of return and price functions
that allow us to derive a so called admissible region for the equity premium later on. Let
{d}∞t=0 denote the dividend process. Then an arbitrary stream of dividends attains a price
qt = Et
[
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−t · U ′(ys)/U ′(yt) · ds
]
.
From dt = yt in equilibrium and power utility we get
qt = q(yt, zt) = E
[
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−t · y
γ
t
yγs
· ys|zt, yt
]
. (41)
10gi > 0 does not imply that growth is always positive. A value of g < 1 would, in fact, imply negative
growth.
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The state variables zt and yt are sufficient to determine the future evolution of the economy.
The state of the economy can then be represented by a tuple (c, i) where c = yt (equilibrium
condition) and i represents growth rate gi. Since ys = yt · zt+1 · . . . · zs one can easily see
that prices are homogeneous of degree one in yt. This can be verified by multiplying ys and
yt by an arbitrary factor. Hence, we can express equity prices as
q(c, i) = β ·
n∑
j=1
φi,j · c
γ
(c · gj)γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
U′(yt+1)
U′(yt)
·
[
q(c · gj , j) + c · gj
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=qt+1+yt+1
, (42)
i.e. equity prices can be expressed as a discounted average of the marginal rate of substitu-
tion cγ/(c · gj)γ multiplied by the asset’s payoff q(c · gj , j)+ c · gj . This is just an alternative
representation of the fundamental asset pricing equation (32) under the assumption of a
power utility function.
The homogeneity property implies
q(c, i) = wi · c (43)
with wi being a constant. Substituting (43) into (42) yields
wi = β ·
n∑
j=1
φi,j · (c · gj)−γ · [q(c · gj , j) + c · gj ] · cγ · c−1
= β ·
n∑
j=1
[
φi,j · g1−γj ·
q(c, j)
c︸ ︷︷ ︸
=wj
+φi,j · g1−γj
]
= β ·
n∑
j=1
φi,j · g1−γj · (wj + 1)
for all i = 1, . . . , n. This system of n equations has a unique positive solution. Given that
(c, i) denotes the present state and (c · gj , j) the next period state, one-period returns can
be written as
Ri,j =
q(c · gj , j) + c · gj
q(c, i)
=
c · gj · wj + c · gj
wi · c
=
gj · (wj + 1)
wi
.
(44)
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The first line is simply an alternative representation of Rt+1 in (32). In the second line
the homogeneity property of the price function is applied. Hence, the expected one-period
return for a given state i is then
Ri =
n∑
j=1
φi,j ·Ri,j . (45)
Analogously, starting from equation (41) one obtains for the bond price
pbi = p
b(c, i)
= β ·
n∑
j=1
φi,j · U ′(gj · c)/U ′(c)
= β ·
n∑
j=1
φi,j · g−γj
(46)
which translates into a period return of
Rrfi =
1
pbi
(47)
given that the current state is (c, i). Since the stochastic process of the consumption growth
rate has been assumed to be ergodic one can find a unique vector v of stationary probabilities
such that v is a solution of
v = v ·Π
where Π denotes the transition matrix of the Markov process and
∑n
i=1 vi = 1. The vector
v represents the probabilities of being in an arbitrary state i. Therefore, the expected
one-period equity return and the expected risk-free rate are
Et[Rt+1] =
n∑
i=1
vi ·Ri and Et[Rrft+1] =
n∑
i=1
vi ·Rrfi . (48)
3.1.2 Testing and Results
In their seminal paper Prescott and Mehra (1985) derive a so called admissible region for
the equity premium in order to demonstrate the large deviation between theoretically im-
plied premia and those empirically observed. For that purpose a simple model economy is
constructed. The Markov chain of the consumption growth process is defined as follows.
The growth rate is restricted to the two values
g1 = 1 + gz + σz, g2 = 1 + gz − σz
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and the transition matrix equals
Π =
(
φ 1− φ
1− φ φ
)
.
The parameter values for gz, σz and φ were chosen to reflect the sample values of the US
economy for the period between 1889 and 1978 which are gz = 0.018, σz = 0.036 and a
first-order serial correlation of −0.14 for gz which translates into a value of φ = 0.43. Given
this set of values one then calibrates the preference parameters γ and β to replicate the
empirically observed averaged risk-free rate and the equity risk premium. A multitude of
papers has addressed the issue of deriving plausible values for the risk aversion coefficient γ
in a variety of contexts with slightly differing results. While Kydland and Prescott (1982)
and Hildreth and Knowles (1982) estimate the parameter to be between 1 and 2, Dolde
and Tobin (1971) derives similar results of about 1.5 as does Friend and Blume (1975) with
a coefficient of about 2. The results of Arrow (1971) and Altug (1989) differ with values
of 1 and “near zero” respectively (see Prescott and Mehra (1985), p. 154). Henceforth,
Mehra and Prescott constrain the value of γ a priori to be less than 10 since otherwise any
risk-free rate and equity premium could be justified by slightly adjusting the parameters
of the consumption process. Deriving admissible regions for the equity premium and the
risk-free rate is a straightforward algorithm (see Prescott and Mehra (1985), p. 159). Using
equations (44) - (48) one can derive the one-period expected return Et[rt+1] and the one-
period risk-free rate Et[r
rf
t+1] (and hence the equity premium) by choosing the risk aversion
coefficient γ and the indiviual’s discount factor β from the set
S ≡ {(γ, β) : 0 < γ ≤ 10, 0 < β < 1}.
The set S reflects our a priori upper bound for γ in the region of 10 (see above) and the
usual impatience assumption about preferences which are reflected by a β of less than 1.
Additionally, γ and β must be chosen such that the existence condition that we imposed
earlier is satisfied (see equation (40) on page 31). The resulting admissible region is depicted
in figure 1. The interval for the risk-free rate that is supported by the underlying economic
model is between 0 and 4 % while the average equity premium ranges between 0 and 0.35
%. These figures are surely a great way off what has been observed empirically in the period
between 1889 and 1978. While the empirical equity premium during that time equals - on
average - 6.98 % with a standard deviation of 1.76 % the observed risk-free is only a mere
0.80 %. Hence, the empirical equity premium is almost 18 times as large as the one implied
by the model if one considers the empirical average and the maximal premium implied by the
model. To verify these results Prescott and Mehra (1985) perform a variety of parameter ad-
justments. Varying the period length of the model to n = 2, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, 1/64, 1/128
and gz = 0.018/n, σz = 0.036/
√
n accordingly to match the annual values of gz = 0.018 and
σz = 0.036 results in negligible changes in the range of hundreths of percentages
11. Simi-
11One should note that the variance of a sum of random variables only equals the sum of the variances
when the random variables are independent. In the present case this implies that φ = 0.5.
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Figure 1: Admissible Region of Equity Premium and Risk-Free Rate (Cochrane (2008))
larly, varying gz to a bunch of values between 0.014 and 0.022 with φ = 0.43 and σz = 0.036
results only in miniscule changes as well. For different values of σz between 0.21 and 0.51
the premium varied with the square of σz, i.e. the premium for σz = 0.51 was only 0.09
percentage points larger than for σz = 0.21. Finally, when changing φ between 0.005 and
0.95 with the other two parameters fixed the premium declined as φ increased gradually.
Finally, to test for sensitivity due to higher moments (i.e. beyond mean and variance) the
authors used a Markov chain with transition matrix
Π =


φ/2 φ/2 (1− φ)/2 (1− φ)/2
φ/2 φ/2 (1− φ)/2 (1− φ)/2
(1− φ)/2 (1− φ)/2 φ/2 φ/2
(1− φ)/2 (1− φ)/2 φ/2 φ/2,


growth parameters g1 = g3 = 1 + gz, g2 = 1 + gz + σz, g4 = 1 + gz − σz and parameters
gz = 0.018, σz = 0.051 and φ = 0.36 to replicate the corresponding properties of the em-
pirical time series. Again, however, this changes the maximal average premium only up to
0.39 % which is still far off the long-run average (see Prescott and Mehra (1985), p. 159–160).
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Finally, the authors identify firm leverage as a possible source of bias. In the analysis
provided above and in the introductory section the security was assumed to be a primitive
claim on the output process by a representative investor. In reality such securities have
varying characteristics including significantly different risk-return profiles. Typical securi-
ties traded in real financial markets entitle its owner to receive part of a profit residual.
The latter is simply “what is left” after other stakeholders such as debt owners, workers
and the like have been served. It is therefore claimed that “a disproportionate part of the
uncertainty in output is probably borne by equity owners” (see Prescott and Mehra (1985),
p. 157). Hence, an adapted version of the model is suggested as follows. It is assmued that
a certain share of the total output in t+1, say ǫ, is reserved for other stakeholders in period
t. Then equation (42) becomes
q(c, i) = β ·
n∑
j=1
φi,j
(c · gj)γ ·
[
q(c · gj , j) + c · gj − ǫ ·
n∑
k=1
φi,k · c · gk
]
· cγ
and hence, by the homogeneity property of prices, we obtain
wi = β ·
n∑
j=1
φi,j · g−γj ·
[
gj · wj + gj − ǫ ·
n∑
k=1
φi,k · gk
]
, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
From here one can then obtain the one-period expected return and the risk-free rate. In their
original contribution Mehra and Prescott used a coefficient ǫ = 0.9 which implies that 10%
of corporate profits go to shareholders on average while the remainder is distributed among
other stakeholders. The effect of this alternative modeling framework was again miniscule
with an equity premium increased by about one-tenth of one percent compared with the
prior case.
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4 An Alternative View on the Puzzle
An alternative perspective on the puzzle is provided by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991).
In contrast to the original Mehra and Prescott paper this more recent approach does not
make use of Markov chain approximations or the like. Instead they derive a mean-variance
frontier for the stochastic discount factor m (see page 26) that is related to the mean-
variance frontier of asset returns introduced by Markowitz (1952). For a better grasp of the
material to follow we will provide a brief introduction to mean-variance analysis in general
and the return frontier in particular.
4.1 Mean-Variance Frontier
A typical mean-variance frontier for a portfolio of 2 assets is depicted in figure 2. The
abscissa represents the standard deviation of expected portfolio returns while the latter are
represented by the ordinate. Hence, the mean-variance frontier answers an intuitive question:
What is the expected return on an investment for a given level of risk or vice versa? In that
regard one has to distinguish between two notions. The mean-variance frontier of risky
assets is represented by the hyperbola connecting both assets. In the presence of a risk-free
security the frontier equals the solid-line wedge-shaped region in figure 2. The minimum
variance portfolio is that portfolio comprised of risky assets with the lowest possible risk.
The tangential portfolio marks that point where the straight line originating at the risk-
free rate is tangent to the mean-variance frontier of risky assets. The tangential portfolio
provides the largest risk-return trade-off among all efficient portfolios, i.e. it possesses the
highest Sharpe ratio which is defined as
SRt+1 =
Et[R
e
t+1]
σt(Rt+1)
where Et[R
e
t+1] = Et[Rt+1] − Rrft denotes the excess return of risky assets over the risk-
free rate. The Sharpe ratio measures the excess return of a portfolio relative to its risk and
therefore provides an intuitive way to measure portfolio returns against one another. Finally,
the dashed wedge-shaped region represents the mean-variance frontier when both assets are
perfectly positively correlated (corr1,2 = −1). The straight line connecting them is simply
the reverse case of perfect positive correlation (corr1,2 = +1) in which case no diversification
benefits can be taken advantage of. In the latter case the portfolio risk is always a linear
combination of the risks associated with both assets individually. The derivation of the
mean-variance frontier is a straightforward optimization problem with constraints. A brief
derivation of the closed-form solutions can be found in Cochrane (2005) (see pp. 81). Let
us consider the fundamental pricing equation (32) again and rewrite it as
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Figure 2: Mean-Variance Frontier with 2 Assets
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1 = Et[mt+1 ·Rt+1]
= Et[mt+1]Et[Rt+1] + corrt(mt+1, Rt+1) · σt(mt+1) · σt(Rt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=covt[mt+1,Rt+1]
.
Dividing by Et[mt+1] then yields
Et[Rt+1] = R
rf
t − corrt(mt+1, Rt+1) ·
σt(mt+1)
Et[mt+1]
· σt(Rt+1). (49)
Since any correlation coefficient fulfills corr ∈ [−1, 1] we obtain
−σt(mt+1)
Et[mt+1]
· σt(Rt+1) ≤ Et[Rt+1]−Rrft ≤
σt(mt+1)
Et[mt+1]
· σt(Rt+1).
Let us have a closer look at equation (49) first. Letting corrt(mt+1, Rt+1) = 1 or corrt(mt+1, Rt+1) =
−1 one obtains a linear function with an intercept equal to Rrft and slopes −σt(mt+1)Et[mt+1] and
σt(mt+1)
Et[mt+1]
respectively. Obviously, equation (49) is represented by the solid-line wedge-shaped
region in figure 2 originating at the risk-free rate. Hence, any risk-return tuple must lie be-
tween these two straight lines. Furthermore, every return on any of the two lines is perfectly
correlated with the discount factor m since we assumed corrt(mt+1, Rt+1) to be equal to
either 1 or -1. The returns on the upper part of the frontier having a positive slope are thus
perfectly negatively correlated with the stochastic discount factor while those on the lower
frontier are perfectly positively correlated with it. A positive and negative correlation with
m then implies a negative and positive correlation with consumption respectively. Returns
on the lower frontier have the insurance property that we characterized in the previous sec-
tions. Those on the upper frontier are negatively correlated with the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution and therefore command a higher return. The argument behind this is
intuitive. When the IMRS is large consumption is low, i.e. assets which yield low returns in
such cases are not favoured by investors. In fact, investors would prefer high yielding assets
in times of low consumption in order to consume more.
4.2 Decomposing Returns in the Mean-Variance Space
In what follows our aim is to derive a mean-variance frontier for the stochastic discount
factor that is directly related to the mean-variance frontier of asset returns. In a first step
we will show that asset returns can be decomposed into a sum of 3 orthogonal components.
The decomposition was first shown by Hansen and Richard (1987). The proof that will
be shown here will be a shortened version based on Cochrane (2005) (see pp. 85). Time
subscripts of variables will be dropped for the moment since they do not matter. “The
price always comes at t, the payoff at t + 1, and the expectation is conditional on time t
information” (see Cochrane (2005), p. 16).
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4.2.1 Payoff Space, State Diagram and the Price Function
In the following section we will introduce a variety of preliminaries and concepts to un-
derstand an alternative derivation of the mean-variance frontier that will be provided in
subsequent chapters. We will briefly discuss the space of payoffs, the free portfolio forma-
tion assumption as well as the law of one price. Additionally, some geometric fundamentals
and properties of returns and payoffs will be provided.
Let the payoff space be denoted by X ⊂ RS where S denotes the number of possible states
of nature. It is assumed that any payoff can be synthesized by a set of basis payoffs which
are elements in the payoff space (see Cochrane (2005), pp. 65). Mathematically, this can be
expressed as
x1, x2 ∈ X ⇒ α1 · x1 + α2 · x2 ∈ X, ∀ α1, α2 ∈ R,
i.e. a payoff generated from basis payoffs is also an element in the payoff space. We refer
to this as the free portfolio formation property. The factors α1 and α2 can be thought of
as weights. In case of an equally weighted two-asset portfolio we would trivially have α1 =
α2 = 0.5. Above definition rules out short-selling- or leverage constraints since α1, α2 ∈ R.
The portfolio weights can take on any value on the real line. A further assumption is the so
called law of one price which says that portfolios with the same payoff must have the same
price ruling out arbitrage opportunities in equilibrium. Mathematically,
q(α1 · x1 + α2 · x2) = α1 · q(x1) + α2 · q(x2).
Let p ∈ RS+ denote the vector of contingent claims prices. More specifically, we have
p = [p1, . . . , pS ].
Also, let
x = [x1, . . . , xS ]
denote an arbitrary payoff vector where xs denotes the payoff in state s. The price of some
payoff x is given by
q(x) =
S∑
s=1
ps · xs = p · xT = |p| × |proj(x|p)| = |p| × |x| × cosκ, (50)
i.e. the price of a payoff is simply the inner product of the contingent claim price vector
and the payoff vector where |.| denotes the vector length, proj(x|p) denotes the projection of
x on p and κ is the angle formed by x and p. We want to derive the intuition behind figure 3.
Let us think of any return as a payoff with unit price. This is easily verified by looking
at the central pricing equation (32). Furthermore, let us consider excess returns. The price
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Figure 3: State Price Diagram (Cochrane (2005))
of an excess return equals zero which follows from a trivial argument. Suppose an investor
borrows a certain amount of money at a rate Rb and invests it at some rate Ra. His net
investment (the price i.e.) is equal to zero and his return equals Re = Ra − Rb. In such a
bet it is equally likely to gain or lose. Hence, investors do not pay a price q > 0 to enter
such a lottery. In the case that the borrowing rate Rb equals the risk-free interest rate Rrf
we obtain the excess return of a risky asset over a risk-free rate.
Consider figure 3. There are two possible states. The ordinate represents state 2 payoffs
while the abscissa represents payoffs in the first state. p refers to the contingent claim
price vector which points into the positive orthant from the origin. Prices are obtained by
means of an inner product as in equation (50). Two vectors are called orthogonal when their
inner product is equal to zero. Using our argument from above the plane representing the
set of excess returns must be orthogonal to p since excess returns have a zero price. The
plane of excess returns therefore points out from the origin at right angles to the contingent
claim price vector p. Furthermore, payoffs on the same plane must have the same price. This
simply follows from the fact that all payoffs on a plane of constant price that is perpendicular
to the vector p (e.g. the q = 1 plane) have the same projection onto p. Additionally, planes of
constant price are parallel to each other. Suppose this was not the case. Then one could find
payoffs which lie on both planes implying that they have two different prices. This clearly
contradicts the law of one price assumption that we imposed earlier to rule out arbitrage
opportunities. Finally, the zero payoff trivially has a zero price and planes of constant price
move out linearly (i.e. q(x) = 1⇒ q(2x) = 2q(x) = 2) which implies the linearity property
of the pricing function introduced earlier (see Cochrane (2005), p. 62).
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4.2.2 A Payoff x′ as a Discount Factor
The free portfolio formation property and the law of one price ensure that we can, in fact,
find a special payoff x′ ∈ X that can be used as the stochastic discount factor, i.e. we are
looking for a payoff that represents prices by means of an inner product.
Lemma 4.1 There is a unique x′ ∈ X such that q(x) = E[x′ · xT ], ∀x ∈ X, i.e. payoff x′
is, in fact, a discount factor.
The proof is straightforward and works as follows:
Proof Let the payoff space be spanned by N basis payoffs, i.e. any arbitrary payoff can be
constructed from a linear combination of these payoffs. Let
X = [x1, x2, . . . , xN ]
denote a vector containing the N basis payoffs with xn ∈ RS , n = 1, . . . , N . Each xn is
actually a row vector of the form
xn = [xn,1, . . . , xn,S ]
containing S elements (one outcome for each possible state s). Hence, X maybe interpreted
as a matrix of dimension S ×N . Furthermore, let
Q = [q1, . . . , qN ]
denote the price vector of the basis assets x1, . . . , xN with qn ∈ R+, n = 1, . . . , N . The
payoff space can then be expressed as
X = {c ·XT }
where c ∈ RN can be thought of as some vector of asset weights. Since we require x′ ∈ X
we must have x′ = c ·XT . Then
Q = E[x′ ·X]
Q = E[c ·XT ·X]
QT = E[XT ·X · cT ]
QT = E[XT ·X] · cT
cT = E[XT ·X]−1 ·QT .
Obvisouly, the random matrix E[XT · X] must be invertible to guarantee existence and
uniqueness of c. Hence, we get
x′ = Q ·E[XT ·X]−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡c
·XT
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which is a linear combination of the basis payoffs x1, . . . , xN and therefore x
′ ∈ X.

Besides the algebraic derivation there also exists a very trivial geometric derivation. Looking
at figure 3 one simply has to pick a payoff vector that is orthogonal to the plane of excess
returns and perpendicular to the other planes of constant price. In order to price arbitrary
payoffs one simply has to choose a vector of the “right length” (see Cochrane (2005), p. 67).
Since q(x) = |x′| × |x| × cosκ the right length is determined as
|x′| = q(x)|x| × cosκ.
Hence, one could simply replace the vector p in figure 3 by some vector x′. The payoff x′ is
needed in order to define a special return R′ that corresponds to this payoff. Its properties
are evaluated in the next section.
4.2.3 An Alternative Derivation of the Mean-Variance Frontier
Traditionally, the derivation of the mean-variance frontier is done via a simple maximization
or minimization problem. Closed-form solutions exist for simple cases without any market
frictions such as short-sales constraints and the like. The aim of the following section is to
introduce an orthogonal decomposition of arbitrary returns and derive the mean-variance
frontier from there. We will begin by defining a return R′ which corresponds to the discount
factor x′ that we derived in the previous section. Let
R′ ≡ x
′
q(x′)
=
x′
E[x′ · x′T ] .
The first fraction is simply a payoff divided by a price (hence a return). In the second
fraction the price q is replaced by E[m ·xT ] with m = x′ and x = x′. Let the space of excess
return be defined as follows:
Re ≡ {x ∈ X : q(x) = 0}
The space of excess returns contains those payoffs with a price equal to zero. Let the
projection of a variable y onto a variable x be defined as
proj(y|x) = βxT = E[x · xT ]−1 ·E[y · xT ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=β
xT
which is simply a linear regression of variable y on the regressor x without a constant. Let
the return Re
′
be given by
Re′ ≡ proj(1|Re) (51)
where Re denotes the space of excess returns, i.e. Re
′
can be thought of as some sort of
mean excess return. While x′ ∈ X represents prices of arbitrary future payoffs with an
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inner product (see proof 4.2.2), the return Re
′ ∈ Re represents means in the space of excess
returns, i.e.
E[Re] = E[1×Re] = E[proj(1|Re)×Re] = E[Re′ ×Re], ∀Re ∈ Re
where a× b denotes the cross product of vectors a and b. Having established the setup and
major definitions we can state the following theorems in order to construct the mean-variance
frontier using R′ and Re
′
:
Theorem 4.2 An arbitrary return Ri can be written as Ri = R
′ + wi · Re′ + ni where
wi ∈ R and ni denotes an excess return with E[ni] = 0. Also, E[R′ · Re′T ] = E[R′ · nTi ] =
E[Re′ · nTi ] = 0, i.e. all components are uncorrelated with each other.
Theorem 4.3 Rmv is on the mean-variance frontier ⇔ Rmv = R′ + w ·Re′, w ∈ R.
Proof In the following proof we will look at things mainly from an algebraic perspective.
For the moment we will stick with the mathematics and later on provide an economic
interpretation for each component. For the geometric part we will mostly refer to figures
4 and 5 which is a three-dimensional extension of figure 3. Let 0 denote the origin. As we
pointed out before one can use the payoff x′ as the discount factor to price arbitrary payoffs
by means of an expectations inner product (see section 4.2.2). Additionally, we reasoned
why excess returns have a zero price. The lower plain in figure 4 represents the space of
excess returns as defined earlier. Obviously, putting together the facts we have
0 = E[x′ ·Re′T ] = 1
q(x′)
·E[x′ ·Re′T ] = E
[
x′
q(x′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=R′
·Re′T
]
= E[R′ ·Re′T ]. (52)
Using x′ as the discount factor we obtain a zero price for any excess return, hence also for
the return Re
′
. Multiplying on both sides with 1/q(x′) and getting the fraction into the
expected value operator we deduce that R′ is orthogonal to the vector Re
′
. In fact, R′ is
orthogonal to any vector in the space of excess returns. The parameter wi can be interpreted
as some kind of control variable for an investor to choose his desired mean return on the
frontier. Finally, ni is defined such that
ni ≡ Ri −R′ − wi ·Re′ (53)
and it is an excess return by assumption. One should think of ni as an idiosyncratic return
component that is attributable to the specifics of a company e.g. and hence can be diversified
away in a portfolio context. Investors are not rewarded for non-systematic risk and therefore
E[ni] = 0 must hold. We can also derive this result mathematically as follows. In equation
(52) we showed that R′ is orthogonal to any excess return.
Thus,
E[R′ · nTi ] = 0
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Figure 4: Orthogonal Decomposition in State Space (Cochrane (2005))
must hold trivially since ni is an excess return. In section 4.2.1 we introduced R
e′ as an
excess return that represents means on Re. Then
E[ni] = E[1× ni] = E[proj(1|Re)× ni] = E[Re′ × ni].
So, in order to get E[ni] = 0 we need an ni that is orthogonal to R
e′. Using
wi =
E[Ri]−E[R′]
E[Re′]
we obtain
⇔ E[ni] = E[Ri]−E[R′]− wi ·E[Re′]
⇔ E[ni] = E[Ri]−E[R′]− E[Ri]−E[R
′]
E[Re′]
·E[Re′]
⇔ E[ni] = 0.
The first equality is simply the expected value operator applied to the definition of ni as in
equation (53). Plugging in wi yields E[ni] = 0. Finally, having
Ri = R
′ + wi ·Re′ + ni (54)
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and
E[R′ ·Re′T ] = E[R′ · nTi ] = E[Re′ · nTi ] = 0 (55)
delivers the mean-variance frontier with
E[Ri] = E[R
′] + wi ·E[Re′] (56)
and
σ2(Ri) = σ
2(R′) + w2i · σ2(Re′) + σ2(ni). (57)
Equation (56) follows from (54) simply by applying the expected value operator and the
fact that E[ni] = 0. Since all return components are orthogonal the variance of some return
Ri equals equation (57). 
More intuition is provided in figures 4 and 5. Mean-variance analysis is all about minimizing
variance for a given level of expected return. In figure 4 we are looking for the shortest way
from the origin to some point Ri in the space of returns. One can interpret the length of a
return vector as a second moment (variance i.e.). Hence, it is natural to seek the shortest
way or smallest variance possible to the corresponding return level Ri which is along the
lines of R′ +wi ·Re′ . R′ is the minimum second-moment return. Firstly, among all returns
it is closest to the origin which can be seen easily in figure 4. Secondly, we can verify this
property from equation (57). Let wi = 0 and ni = 0 then
Ri = R
′ + wi ·Re′ + ni
⇔ E[Ri ·RTi ] = E[R′ ·R′T ] + w2i ·E[Re′ ·Re′T ] +E[ni · nTi ]
⇔ σ2(Ri) = σ2(R′) + w2i · σ2(Re′) + σ2(ni)
⇔ σ2(Ri) = σ2(R′).
For any other tuple (wi, ni) we get σ
2(Ri) > σ
2(R′). In the second step all “covariance
terms” drop out since each component is orthogonal to any other component by construction.
Hence, all returns of the same “length” originating at 0 have the same variance. Since lines
of constant second moment are circles the minimum second-moment return is that vector
where the smallest possible circle and the mean-variance frontier intersect in figure 5 at R′.
By changing wi one moves along the frontier. As indicated earlier ni is an idiosyncratic
return component that is not rewarded by the market and hence has zero expected value.
As shown in figure 5 ni only increases variance, but not the expected return. Investors may
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Figure 5: Mean-Variance Frontier (Cochrane (2005))
diversify such risks by altering their asset allocation.
4.3 Hansen-Jagannathan Bounds
Following the previous section on the mean-variance frontier of asset returns we will derive an
analogous decomposition and a corresponding mean-variance frontier of the discount factor
m as in Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) and Cochrane (2005). In the original contribution
the authors use a non-parametric approach for a broader set of dynamic economic models.
It is broader in a sense that it “does not depend either on a Markov chain approximation
with a small number of states or on a narrow class of asset valuation models.” (see Hansen
and Jagannathan (1991), p. 229). Recapitulate from section 4.1
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Figure 6: Duality between Mean-Variance Frontier and HJ-Bounds (Cochrane (2005))
1 = Et[mt+1 ·Rt+1]
⇔ 1 = Et[mt+1] ·Et[Rt+1] + corrt(mt+1, Rt+1) · σt(mt+1) · σt(Rt+1)
⇔ Et[Rt+1] = Rrft − corrt(mt+1, Rt+1) ·
σt(mt+1)
Et[mt+1]
· σt(Rt+1)
⇔ −σt(mt+1)
Et[mt+1]
≤ Et[Rt+1]−R
rf
t
σt(Rt+1)
≤ σt(mt+1)
Et[mt+1]
⇔ σt(mt+1)
Et[mt+1]
≥ |Et[Rt+1]−R
rf
t |
σt(Rt+1)
.
Figure 6 shows the duality between the mean-variance frontier of excess returns and the
stochastic discount factor. The latter frontier can be derived intuitively by deriving those
pairs {E(m), σ(m)} that are consistent with the mean-variance frontier of excess returns.
For any given risk-free rate one has to find the tangency portfolio and the corresponding
Sharpe ratio. One should note that for any given risk-free rate there are always two tan-
gency portfolios. We select that portfolio that has the higher Sharpe ratio in absolute terms.
The Sharpe ratio of the tangency portfolio can then be equated to σ(m)/E(m) deliver-
ing the frontier of the stochastic discount factor (also see Cochrane (2005), p. 93). We look
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at figure 6 twofold. Let us first consider the mean-variance frontier in the left-hand panel.
We first consider those expected returns which are smaller than the expected return that
corresponds to minimum-variance portfolio (i.e. the vertex of the parabola). Shifting the
capital market line (the straight line connecting the risk-free rate and the parabola) upwards
its slope and hence the Sharpe ratio decreases. The upward shift corresponds to an increase
in the risk-free rate and a decrease in E(m). This leads us to the mean-variance frontier of
the stochastic discount factor in the right-hand panel of figure 6. First we only consider the
part on the rhs of the vertex. As E(m) decreases the slope of the capital market line and
hence also the Sharpe ratio decreases. From equation (58) it is then obvious that σ(m) must
decrease as well. In a second step we consider those risk-free rates that are larger then the
expected return that corresponds to the minimum-variance portfolio. By decreasing E(m)
the slope of the capital market line becomes more and more negative. However, since we are
looking at Sharpe rations on an absolute basis, the Sharpe ratio increases and hence also
σ(m) must increase. The mechanics work in the same manner as they did before yielding
the left-hand part of the parabola of the stochastic discount factor.
min
{all m that price x ∈ X}
σt(mt+1)
Et[mt+1]
= max
{all excess returns Re ∈ X}
Et[Rt+1]−Rrft
σt(Rt+1)
(58)
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5 Solving the Puzzle
One can spot two major streams of research addressing the puzzle. The first stream proposes
modifications of the utility functions being used since the CRRA class of functions can
only be made consistent with the observed equity premium when agents are extremely and
unplausibly risk averse. The second stream addresses issues such as borrowing constraints,
transaction costs, liquidity, taxes and regulation as well as potential disaster states.
5.1 Habit Formation
The heart of the model is to propose an alternative specification of the agent’s utility func-
tion. This non-time separable utility function incorporates what is known as habit formation
in economics. Major works in the field include - among others - Abel (1990), Deaton (1992),
Ryder and Heal (1973), Sunderasan (1989) and Constantinides (1990) (see Cochrane (2005),
pp. 207). One can, in general, distinguish between external and internal habit formation.
Within those classes there exist models that use additive as well as multiplicative utility
functions to model preferences. The habit formation approach used in this paper can be
attributed to what is widely known as “catching up with the Joneses”. The term was first
used in Abel (1990) and is synonimously used for external habit. The key feature distin-
guishing external and internal habit is whether an agent’s habit level depends on the agent’s
own past consumption level (internal) or on aggregate consumption (external).
5.2 Campbell-Cochrane Model
In the following section I will review a model by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) which has an
alternative, non-time separable utility function at its core to solve the equity premium puzzle.
Their model captures a wider variety of stock market phenomena such as the procyclical
variation of stock prices, the long-horizon predictability of excess stock returns and the
countercyclical variation of stock market volatility among others. In what follows we will
focus our attention on the model’s capability to explain the short- and long-run equity
premium puzzles with a constant risk-free rate.
5.2.1 Utility, Stochastic Discount Factors and the Interest Rate
In their original contribution Prescott and Mehra (1985) assumed a standard power utility
function to express preferences. The key feature of the model to follow is a slight adaptation
by including a parameter Xt which represents the agent’s habit level. One can think of
the habit level as some kind of consumption level the agent “is used to” or some reference
level that determines consumer satisfaction for subsequent periods. Therefore, in general, an
agent always seeks consumption above such a reference level. The model will be presented in
a discrete time, representative agent setup. Preferences over consumption take the following
form:
50
5.2 Campbell-Cochrane Model Equity Premium Puzzle
E
∞∑
t=0
β
(Ct −Xt)1−γ − 1
1− γ . (59)
One should note that above utility functional is only defined for Ct ≥ Xt, but not for Ct <
Xt. Why? Suppose γ = 0.5. Then
√
Ct −Xt is not defined for Ct < Xt. This implication
will be useful later on when we specify the particular form of a so called sensitivity function
λ(.) that is part of the model. The relation between current consumption and habit can
expressed conveniently as
St ≡ Ct −Xt
Ct
.
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) refer to above fraction as surplus consumption ratio. Obvi-
ously, when Ct = Xt the surplus ratio amounts to 0 which implies a bad state. Furthermore,
as Ct rises relative to the habit level we get St → 1. Additionally, one can relate the lo-
cal curvature of the utility function as expressed in (59) to the surplus consumption ratio
as follows. The first- and second-order derivatives of the utility function with respect to
consumption Ct are
U ′(Ct, Xt) = (Ct −Xt)−γ and U ′′(Ct, Xt) = −γ · (Ct −Xt)−γ−1. (60)
Then
ηt ≡ −Ct · U
′′(Ct, Xt)
U ′(Ct, Xt)
= −Ct · −γ · (Ct −Xt)
−γ−1
(Ct −Xt)−γ = γ ·
Ct
Ct −Xt =
γ
St
(61)
which implies that the lower the surplus consumption ratio, the higher is the curvature of
the utility function. From an economic perspective relative risk aversion (high η) of an agent
is high during bad times (low S). Hence, asset prices are low and expected returns are high.
As we have already indicated at the beginning of the section Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
use an external habit approach, i.e. an agent’s habit is determined by past realizations of
aggregate consumption as opposed to individual consumption. Let
Sat ≡
Cat −Xt
Cat
where the a superscript denotes average consumption of all agents in the economy. In
order to assess how average consumption Cat determines individual habit Xt we assume the
following stochastic process for Sat . In what follows lowercase letters denote logarithms, i.e.
sat = logS
a
t . We then model the log surplus consumption ratio as an AR(1) process of the
form
sat+1 = (1− φ) · s+ φ · sat + λ(sat ) · ǫt+1 (62)
where φ, g and s are parameters and
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∆ct+1 = g + ǫt+1, ǫt+1 ∼ iid N
(
0, σ2ǫ
)
.
The function expressed in equation 62 contains non-linear terms such as the sensitivity
function λ(sat ).
Modeling the surplus consumption ratio as in 62 means that consumption is always
larger than habit. Otherwise it might be the case that consumption becomes smaller than
habit in which case utility would be undefined. Modeling the logarithm of Sat ensures that
Sat > 0 and hence C
a
t −Xt > 0. Since we are operating in a representative agent framework
Ct = C
a
t must hold trivially for all t in equilibrium since each individual chooses the same
consumption level Ct. In (60) we already derived the first- and second-order derivative of
the power utility function U(Ct, Xt) we defined in (59).
Marginal utility can then be written as
U ′(Ct, Xt) = (Ct −Xt)−γ =
(
Ct −Xt
Ct
)−γ
· C−γt = S−γt · C−γt .
The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (see equation (32)) then becomes
mt+1 = β · U
′(Ct+1, Xt+1)
U ′(Ct, Xt)
= β ·
(
St+1
St
· Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
. (63)
We can relate (63) to the state variable st and the consumption innovation ǫt+1 as follows
mt+1 = β ·
(
St+1
St
· Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
= β · exp(−γ · (st+1 − st)) · exp(−γ · (ct+1 − ct))
= β · exp(−γ · (st+1 − st)) · exp(−γ · (g + ǫt+1))
= β · exp(−γ · (st+1 − st)) · exp(−γ · g) · exp(−γ · ǫt+1)
= β ·G−γ · exp(−γ · (st+1 − st + ǫt+1))
Substituting (62) for st+1 we arrive at
mt+1 = β ·G−γ · exp(−γ · [(φ− 1) · (st − s) + [1 + λ(st)] · ǫt+1]).
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From section 4.3 we recapitulate that
σt(mt+1)
Et[mt+1]
≥ −corrt(mt+1, Rt+1) · σt(mt+1)
Et[mt+1]
=
Et[Rt+1]−Rrft
σt(Rt+1)
.
Let the stochastic discount factor mt+1 be a lognormal random variable such that
E(X) = exp(µ+ σ2/2) and σ2(X) = exp(2µ+ σ2) · (exp(σ2)− 1)
imply
σ(X)
E(X)
=
√
exp(σ2)− 1.
Then
max
{all assets}
Et[Rt+1]−Rrft
σt(Rt+1)
=
σt(mt+1)
Et[mt+1]
=
√
exp(γ2 · (1 + λ(st)2) · σ2ǫ )− 1
≈ γ · σǫ · (1 + λ(st)).
Economically, we can relate the Sharpe ratio to a function of the surplus consumption ratio.
We have not yet specified what this function might look like. Intuitively, it should produce
a high Sharpe ratio (and hence a high excess return) during bad times. So, λ(st) must take
on large values when st is small. Before we find a specific functional form for λ(st) we have
a look at the risk-free rate. In section 2.4.3 we derived the risk-free rate to be equal to the
inverse of the conditionally expected stochastic discount factor, i.e.
Rrft =
1
Et[mt+1]
.
Substituting the stochastic discount factor into the denominator yields
1
Et[mt+1]
= 1/ exp(lnβ − γ · g − γ · (φ− 1) · (st − s) + 0.5 · γ2[1 + λ(st)]2 · σ2ǫ ) (64)
and
lnRrft = − lnβ + γ · g − γ · (1− φ) · (st − s)− 0.5 · γ2[1 + λ(st)]2 · σ2ǫ . (65)
One can identify 2 sources that influence the risk-free rate, intertemporal substitution as
well as precautionary savings. The former is represented by the term st − s. When the
surplus consumption ratio is small relative to its average (i.e. Ct is close to habit Xt) then
marginal utility of consumption is high. Since an agent wants to consume more in that
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case he will borrow and thus drive up the interest rate. The precautionary savings reflects
uncertainty. During uncertain periods consumers are willing to save more and consume less
which drives the interest rate down.
5.2.2 Sensitivity Function
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) notice that there is relatively little variation in the data
with regard to the risk-free interest rate. Hence, either the parameter φ is close to one in
which case the impact of st−s on the risk-free rate vanishes or λ(st) is chosen such that the
precautionary savings effect offets the intertemporal substitution effect. This would be the
case when λ(st) increases as st declines. Thus, one requirement for the sensitivity function
is a constant risk-free interest rate making the model consistent with the empirical data. A
second condition is that habit is predetermined at the steady state st = s. Finally, habit is
also predetermined near the steady state which is equivalent to positive consumption shocks
increasing habit, but never reducing it. Mathematically, this is equivalent to ∂x/∂c ≥ 0.
The latter two conditions ensure that consumption is always larger than habit. Otherwise
it might happen that consumption is below habit in which case the utility function is not
defined as outlined before. In fact, the sensitivity could be chosen such that the interest
rate is a linear function of the state variable st. However, this does not have any effect on
the results to follow (see Campbell and Cochrane (1999), p. 216). The authors propose the
following functional relationships
S = σ ·
√
γ
1− φ (66)
and
λ(st) =


1
S
·√1− 2(st − s)− 1 if st ≤ smax
0 if st > smax
(67)
respectively in order to fulfill above criteria. smax refers to the maximum surplus consump-
tion ratio which is defined as
smax ≡ s+ 0.5 · (1− S2). (68)
Above identity can be derived by setting the upper expression of the sensitivity function
equal to zero and solve for st = smax. Now, how do we eventually arrive at above function?
From the previous section we briefly recapitulate the risk-free interest rate to be of the form
lnRrft = − lnβ + γ · g − γ · (1− φ) · (st − s)− 0.5 · γ2[1 + λ(st)]2 · σ2ǫ . (69)
Let
Q ≡ − lnRrft − lnβ + γ · g.
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Equation (69) then becomes
0 = Q− γ · (1− φ) · (st − s)− 0.5 · γ2[1 + λ(st)]2 · σ2ǫ .
Solving for λ yields
λ(st) =
√
2 · (Q− γ · (1− φ)(st − s))
σ2ǫ · γ2
− 1.
Let
Y ≡ 2 ·Q
σ2ǫ · γ2
such that
λ(st) =
√
Y − 2 · (1− φ)(st − s)
σ2ǫ · γ
− 1. (70)
We then have to find a solution for Q such that the conditions 2 and 3 are fulfilled, i.e. the
habit level should be predetermined at and near the steady state. Let us first recapitulate
equation (62) from the previous section, i.e.
st+1 = (1− φ) · s+ φ · st + λ(st) · ǫt+1
where ǫt+1 = ct+1 − ct − g. The surplus consumption ratio is a function of both, Ct as well
as Xt. We will first evaluate the total derivative of st+1 which is
∂st+1
∂ logXt+1
· d logXt+1 + ∂st+1
∂ logCt+1
· d logCt+1 = λ(st) · d logCt+1. (71)
From
st+1 = log
(
Ct+1 −Xt+1
Ct+1
)
we can obtain the partial derivatives with respect to logCt+1 and logXt+1. We first restate
the log surplus consumption ratio as
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st+1 = log
(
Ct+1 −Xt+1
Ct+1
)
= log
(
1− Xt+1
Ct+1
)
= log(1− exp(log(Xt+1/Ct+1)))
= log(1− exp(logXt+1 − logCt+1))
Then
∂st+1
∂ logXt+1
= − exp(logXt+1 − logCt+1)
1− exp(logXt+1 − logCt+1)
= −
Xt+1
Ct+1
1− Xt+1
Ct+1
= −
Xt+1
Ct+1
Ct+1−Xt+1
Ct+1
= −Xt+1
Ct+1
· Ct+1
Ct+1 −Xt+1 = −
Xt+1
Ct+1 −Xt+1
= −Xt+1 + Ct+1 − Ct+1
Ct+1 −Xt+1
= −
(
Ct+1
Ct+1 −Xt+1 − 1
)
= −
(
1
St+1
− 1
)
.
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The partial derivative with respect to logCt+1 is
∂st+1
∂ logCt+1
=
exp(logXt+1 − logCt+1)
1− exp(logXt+1 − logCt+1)
=
1
St+1
− 1.
We can now substitute both expressions into (71) to get
−
(
1
St+1
− 1
)
· d logXt+1 +
(
1
St+1
− 1
)
· d logCt+1 = λ(st) · d logCt+1.
Eventually, dividing by d logCt+1 and rearrganging we obtain
d logXt+1
d logCt+1
= 1− λ(st)1
St+1
− 1 = 1−
λ(st)
exp(−st+1)− 1 ≈ 1−
λ(st)
exp(−st)− 1
where the latter approximation holds close to the steady state. Since we are looking for a
function λ such that d logXt+1/d logCt+1 = 0 holds at st = s the following must hold
1− λ(s)
exp(−s)− 1 = 0⇔ λ(s) =
1
S
− 1.
Using above result and substituting in (70) one can solve for Y.
λ(s) =
√
Y − 2 · (1− φ)(s− s)
σ2ǫ · γ
− 1⇔ Y = exp(−2 · s).
Having derived Y we obtain the function as outlined in equatin (67). Finally, using the
third requirement that habit is also predetermined near the steady state one can derive the
expression in equation (66) as follows. We evaluate the first derivative of λ with respect to
st at st = s. Then
d
dst
d logXt+1
d logCt+1
=
d
dst
(
1− λ(st)
exp(−st+1)− 1
)
= −
[
λ′(st) · (exp(−st+1)− 1)− λ(st) ·
(
− ∂st+1
∂st
)
· exp(−st+1)
(exp(−st+1)− 1)2
]
= −
[
λ′(st)
exp(−st+1)− 1 +
λ(st) · ∂st+1∂st · exp(−st+1)
(exp(−st+1)− 1)2
]
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Figure 7: Sensitivity Function λ with Steady State Surplus Consumption Ratio (Bold) and
Maximum Surplus Consumption Ratio (Dashed) (Campbell and Cochrane (1999))
where
∂st+1
∂st
=
d
(
(1− φ) · s+ φ · st + λ(st) · ǫt+1
)
dst
= φ+ λ′(st) · ǫt+1.
Substituting above expression for the partial derivative yields
d
dst
d logXt+1
d logCt+1
= − λ
′(st)
exp(−st+1)− 1 −
λ(st) · (φ+ λ′(st) · ǫt+1) · exp(−st+1)
(exp(−st+1)− 1)2
= − λ
′(st)
1
St+1
− 1 −
φ · λ(st)(
1
St+1
− 1
)2 · 1St+1 − λ
′(st) · λ(st) · ǫt+1(
1
St+1
− 1
)2 · 1St+1 .
Hence, at st = s, above expression becomes
d
dst
d logXt+1
d logCt+1
= − λ
′(s)
1
S
− 1 −
φ · λ(s)(
1
S
− 1
)2 · 1S − λ
′(s) · λ(s) · ǫt+1(
1
S
− 1
)2 · 1S ≡ 0.
In order to eliminate the stochastic term ǫt+1 we take expectations of above expression
to obtain
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Figure 8: Derivative of the logX wrt logC (Campbell and Cochrane (1999))
0 ≡ − λ
′(s)
1
S
− 1 −
φ · λ(s)(
1
S
− 1
)2 · 1S
⇔ 0 ≡ −λ′(s) · (1− S)− φ · λ(s).
We arrive at the second line multiplying the first line by 1
S
− 1 = 1−S
S
. Eventually we get
λ′(s) = −φλ(s)
1− S =
φλ(s)
S − 1 =
φ · (exp(−s)− 1)
exp(s)− 1 = −φ · exp(−s).
Putting together the facts we have
λ(st) =
√
exp(−2 · s)− 2 · (1− φ)(st − s)
σ2ǫ · γ
− 1,
λ′(st) = −2 · (1− φ)
γσ2ǫ
· 1
2 ·
√
exp(−2 · s)− 2·(1−φ)(st−s)
σ2ǫ ·γ
and
λ′(s) = −φ · exp(−s).
Hence, at st = s
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− 1
exp(−s) ·
1− φ
γσ2ǫ
= −φ · exp(−s)
and thus
S = exp(s) = σǫ ·
√
γ · φ
1− φ ≈ σǫ ·
√
γ
1− φ.
The approximation holds since φ is close to 1 empirically. E.g. Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) use a value of φ = 0.87 in their analysis (see table 1). Last, but not least, the resulting
function is depicted in figure 7. One can immediately spot the countercyclical nature that is
imposed upon the Sharpe ratio. The abcissa contains the surplus consumption ratio that we
use as a proxy for good and bad times. The higher it is the better is the perceived economic
climate since - in that case - consumption is well above habit. For large values of S the
sensitivity function yields small values λ(s) resulting in small Sharpe ratios. The latter then
imply that excess returns over the risk-free rate are relatively low and asset prices high which
makes sense intuitively. On the contrary when s is small λ yields large values which in turn
results in high Sharpe ratios. Hence, excess returns relative to the risk-free rate are large
and asset prices are low. So, our sensititivy function has the desired properties to model
the countercyclical nature of returns, asset prices and Sharpe ratios. The bold vertical line
marks the steady state surplus consumption ratio while the dashed vertical line refers to the
maximum surplus consumption ratio as defined in equation (68). Mathematically, as the
surplus consumption ratio approaches zero λ goes to infinity. It goes to zero as the surplus
consumption ratio approaches its upper bound smax. Figure 8 shows the sensitivity of habit
with respect to consumption. Again, the bold vertical line indicates the steady state surplus
consumption ratio. What we can spot nicely is the feature that habit does not change at
and close to the steady state level. Furthermore, habit moves positively with consumption
everywhere so as to keep habit below consumption all the time.
5.2.3 Data, Simulation and Empirical Results
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) use 2 different datasets to test the validity of the model.
Both datasets differ significantly in length. The first set contains value-weighted NYSE
stock index returns taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 3-month
Treasury bill rate and per capita non-durables and services consumption for the postwar
period between 1947 and 1995. The second dataset contains annual data for the S&P 500
index, commercial paper returns (both 1871–1993) as well as per capita consumption (1889–
1992). Parameters to calibrate the model were chosen such that certain moments in the data
are matched. The corresponding parameters and their values are summarized in table 1.
To assess the validity of the model the authors use those parameters to simulate 500,000
months of artifical data. Monthly data is then used to construct time-averaged annual data.
Table 2 compares simulated data with actual market statistics. Those values marked with an
asterisk are calibration targets and hence coincide with the real data. E.g. the risk aversion
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Parameter Variable Value
Assumed:
Mean consumption growth in % g 1.89*
Std. Dev. of cons. growth in % σǫ 1.50*
Log risk-free rate in % logRrft 0.94*
Persistence Coefficient φ 0.87*
Utility curvature γ 2.00
Implied:
Subjective discount factor β 0.89*
Steady state surplus cons. ratio S 0.057
Maximum surplus cons. ratio Smax 0.094
Table 1: Model Parameters (asterisks indicate annual values)
coefficient γ = 2 was chosen to match the Sharpe ratio of log returns in the postwar sample
of 0.43 and the Sharpe ratio of 0.5 of the discrete returns. A fair objection would be that
parameters are chosen such that certain moments in the data are matched. Hence, by any
choice of parameters one would be able to obtain the desired outcome. In case of the risk
aversion coefficient γ was chosen to match a ratio. That, however, does not reveal anything
further about the levels of the two variables involved. Focusing our attention on the first
column of table 2 one can spot that the model does not only match the ratio, but also the
level of expected excess returns as well as the standard deviation thereof. Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) particularly calibrate the model to resemble the postwar sample “because
they are a significantly harder target” (see p. 225). In addition to the equity premium the
model is able to explain a broad variety of asset pricing phenomena. As outlined above the
proposed model is empirically consistent with the data regarding the equity premium and
the risk-free rate. Similar to the prior section one can show that a standard power utility
function and iid lognormal consumption growth with mean g and standard deviation σǫ the
stochastic discount factor becomes
mt+1 = β ·
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
.
The Sharpe ratio can then be expressed as
Et[Rt+1]−Rrft
σt(Rt+1)
≈ γ · σǫ
with interest rate
logRrft = − log β + γ · g − 0.5 · γ2 · σ2ǫ .
The latter expression was already derived in section 2.4.4. Plugging in the respective values
for the Sharpe ratio ≈ 0.5 and the standard deviation of consumption growth σǫ = 1.22
percent one needs a risk aversion coefficient of γ ≈ 41 which is unplausibly high. Why? If
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Consumption Dividend Postwar Long
Statistic Claim Claim Sample Sample
E(∆c) 1.89* 1.89 1.72
σ(∆c) 1.22* 1.22 3.32
E(rrf ) 0.94* 0.94 2.92
E(r − rrf )/σ(r − rrf ) 0.43* 0.33 0.43 0.22
E(R−Rrf )/σ(R−Rrf ) 0.50 0.50
E(r − rrf ) 6.64 6.52 6.69 3.90
σ(r − rrf ) 15.2 20.0 15.7 18.0
exp[E(p− d)] 18.3 18.7 24.7 21.1
σ(p− d) 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.27
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Simulated and Historical Data
we plug in the respective values into the risk-free rate equation with γ = 41 and g = 1.89%
one would need a discount factor in the region of β = 1.9 in order to get a risk-free interest
rate of about 1 percent. Since we require the discount factor to be β ≤ 1 this implies a risk-
free rate of approximately 90% annually. Furthermore, the risk-free rate is not as sensitive to
changes in mean consumption growth as indicated by a risk aversion coefficient in the region
of 41. How are these drawbacks overcome in the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) model?
In the new setup the risk aversion parameter is set equal to 2 (see table 1). Additionally,
curvature is influenced by the surplus consumption ratio as shown in equation (61). The
curvature is high during bad states (low S), low during good states (high S) and ≈ 35 at
the steady state level where S = 0.057. From (65) and (67) we obtain a constant risk-free
interest rate which has the functional form
logRrft = − log β + γ · g − 0.5 ·
(
γ
S
)2
· σ2ǫ . (72)
In the latter case the risk-free rate is influenced by a risk aversion coefficient in the region
of 2 which allows for a discount factor β = 0.89 smaller than 1. In addition to that the
sensitivity of the interest rate with respect to consumption growth is significantly lower than
in the case without habit formation.
5.2.4 Model Criticism
Despite the models ability to achieve the desired outcome of a high equity premium a
couple of reservations exist - some of which are addressed by the authors in their original
contribution. The first drawback is the representative agent setup that does not allow
for consumer heterogeneity. The habit level is about 5% below actual consumption across
individuals. If one considers the distribution of wealth and income for some poor agents
it might be the case that Ct < Xt in which case utilitiy is not defined (see section 5.2.1).
Furthermore it is obvious that agents with differing income levels have differing stock market
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Figure 9: log marginal utility wrt S (surplus consumption ratio) (Campbell and Cochrane
(1999))
participation ratios. The wealthier an agent is the higher is his participation in the stock
market and vice versa. A second drawback is the fact that the model works under the
assumption of high risk aversion. The curvature parameter of the utility function takes on
a value of about 35 at the steady state. The model is, however, able to avoid unrealistically
high interest rates when β is constrained to be smaller than 1. A third point is the external
habit specification. In contrast to above model in an internal framework habit is determined
by an agents own consumption history. While consumption grows so does habit. Hence,
marginal utility for a given level of consumption declines as habit increases. Since assets are
priced based on relative marginal utility of consumption today and tomorrow a proportional
increase or decline in both does not change the discount factor and hence external and
internal models yield the same results. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) provide conditions
under which this is the case (see p. 245), one being that habit accumulation is linear. This is
different in the present setup in order to obtain a random walk in the consumption process.
In the linear framework habit accumulation would only be close to a random walk. Figure 9
plots the logarithm of marginal utility with respect to the surplus consumption ratio for the
internal as well as the external setup. The major features that one can spot is the fact that
marginal utility has a similar behavior close to the steady state level (indicated by vertical
line), but drifts apart as the surplus consumption ratio reaches its maximum (vertical dotted
line). The larger the change in consumption, the larger is the increase in the habit level
and hence marginal utility declines. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) see the similar behavior
near the steady state of their model and one with an internal specification as an indicator
for the robustness of their model (see p. 246).
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Markov Processes
A stochastic process {X(t)}t=0,1,2,... has the so called Markov property if, for a finite set
with n elements t1 < t2 < . . . < tn, we have
φ(X(tn) ≤ xn|X(t1) = x1, . . . , X(tn−1) = xn−1) = φ(X(tn) ≤ xn|X(tn−1) = xn−1) (73)
for any x1, . . . , xn ∈ R, i.e. the conditional distribution of X(tn) for given realizations
{X(t1), . . . , X(tn−1)} only depends on the most recent value X(tn−1). A Markov chain
{st}t=0,1,2,... is a discrete random process with st ∈ S, where S = (1, . . . , k) is a set of
integers called the state space, and the property
φ(st+1 = j|st = i, . . . , s0 = k) = φ(st+1 = j|st = i).
A Markov chain is called time-invariant if
φ(st+1 = j|st = i) = φ(st+l+1 = j|st+l = i).
Let πi,j ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that the process takes the value st+1 = j given that
st = i, i.e.
φ(st+1 = j|st = i) = πi,j .
For each i we have φi,1 + . . . + φi,k = 1 meaning that, given the realization i, the process
takes on an arbitrary value in S with certainty. The same holds for t = 0 with
∑k
i=1 π0,i = 1,
i.e. the initial value of the process is also on element in S. One can then define a so called
transition matrix for a Markov chain of the form
Π =


φ1,1 φ1,2 . . . φ1,k
φ2,1 φ2,2 . . . φ2,k
...
...
. . .
...
φk,1 φk,2 . . . φk,k

 .
The transition matrix shows the probability that j is realized in t + 1 given that i was
realized in t for all i = 1, . . . , k and j = 1, . . . , k.
A.2 Metric Spaces
The following section will give a very brief overview of the fundamentals of metric spaces.
Definition A metric space (X, ρ) is a set X and a function ρ called a metric with ρ :
X ×X → R with the following properties:
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1. Positivity: ρ(x, y) ≥ 0, ∀x, y ∈ X.
2. Strict Positivity: ρ(x, y) = 0 iff x = y.
3. Symmetry: ρ(x, y) = ρ(y, x), ∀x, y ∈ X.
4. Triangle Inequality: ρ(x, y) ≤ ρ(x, z) + ρ(z, y), ∀x, y, z ∈ X
Definition A sequence {xn} in a metric space (X, ρ) is called a Cauchy sequence if for each
ǫ > 0 there exists an N(ǫ) such that ρ(xn, xm) < ǫ for any n,m ≥ N(ǫ). Hence, a sequence
is called Cauchy if limn,m→∞ ρ(xn, xm) = 0.
Definition A sequence {xn} in a metric space (X, ρ) converges to a limit x ∈ X if for every
ǫ > 0 there exists an N(ǫ) such that ρ(xn, x) < ǫ for n ≥ N(ǫ).
Lemma A.1 Every convergent sequence {xn} in a metric space (X, ρ) is a Cauchy sequence.
Proof Let ǫ > 0. Let x be the limit of {xn}. By the triangle inequality
ρ(xn, xm) ≤ ρ(xn, x) + ρ(x, xm).
Since xn → x, there exists an N such that ρ(xn, x) < ǫ/2 for n ≥ N . This also holds for the
sequence {xm}. Hence, ρ(xn, xm) < ǫ/2 + ǫ/2 = ǫ for n,m ≥ N(ǫ). 
Definition A metric space (X, ρ) is called complete if every Cauchy sequence in (X, ρ)
converges to a point in (X, ρ).
A.3 Contraction Mappings
In the following section we will introduce the notion of a special operator called contraction
mapping.
Definition A function T : X → X mapping a metric space (X, ρ) into itself is called an
operator.
Definition Let (X, ρ) be a metric space and T : X → X a mapping. T is called a contrac-
tion mapping of modulus β if
ρ(Tf, Tg) ≤ β · ρ(f, g), ∀f, g ∈ X
with 0 ≤ β < 1.
From the latter condition imposed on β one can see that the distance of elements in the range
space is smaller than their respective counterparts in the domain. Hence, one can think of
a contraction mapping as a method to bring elements of a metric space closer together.
Theorem A.2 Let (X, ρ) be a complete metric space and let T : X → X be a contraction
mapping with modulus β. Then (i) T has exactly one fixed point v ∈ X, (ii) for any v0 ∈ X,
ρ(Tnv0, v) ≤ βn · ρ(v0, v) for all n = 1, 2, . . . .
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Proof Let the iterates of T , which are a sequence of mappings {Tn}, be defined as T ◦X = X
and TnX = T (Tn−1)X for all n = 1, 2, . . . . Let v0 ∈ X and define a sequence {vn}∞n=0 by
vn = Tvn−1. Hence, we must have vn = T
nv0. This result can easily be verified by repeated
substitution.
vn = Tvn−1
= T (Tvn−2)
= T (T (Tvn−3))
...
= Tnv0
T is a contraction mapping by assumption. Hence,
ρ(v2, v1) = ρ(Tv1, T v0) ≤ β · ρ(v1, v0)
from which we can conclude by induction
ρ(vn+1, vn) ≤ βn · ρ(v1, v0). (74)
Suppose m > n. By the triangle inequality we have
ρ(vm, vn) ≤ ρ(vm, vm−1) + . . .+ ρ(vn+2, vn+1) + ρ(vn+1, vn)
≤ [βm−1 + . . .+ βn+1 + βn] · ρ(v1, v0)
= βn · [βm−n−1 + . . .+ β + 1] · ρ(v1, v0)
≤ β
n
1− β · ρ(v1, v0).
The second line is simply an application of the result in (74). X is a complete metric space
by definition and {vn}∞n=0 is a Cauchy sequence. Hence, we get vn → v as n→∞. To show
that Tv = v we can apply the triangle inequality again to obtain
ρ(Tv, v) ≤ ρ(Tv, Tnv0) + ρ(Tnv0, v)
for all n and v0 ∈ X. T being a contraction then yields
ρ(Tv, v) ≤ β · ρ(v, Tn−1v0) + ρ(Tnv0, v).
Both terms on the rhs converge to 0 as n → ∞. This can easily be verified from the
above result. Hence, ρ(Tv, v) = 0 which implies that Tv = v. So, v is a fixed point in X.
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Uniqueness is established using the following argument. Suppose ∃vˆ ∈ X such that T vˆ = vˆ
and vˆ 6= v. Thus, we get
0 < a = ρ(vˆ, v) = ρ(T vˆ, Tv) ≤ β · ρ(vˆ, v) = β · a.
Since β < 1 by assumption we obtain a contradiction as a 6= β · a. Hence, a can only be
equal to 0 and vˆ = v. So, v ∈ X is unique. Finally, to prove statement (ii) let n ≥ 1. Then
ρ(Tnv0, v) = ρ[T (T
n−1v0), T v] ≤ β · ρ(Tn−1v0, v)
and (ii) simply follows by induction. 
Corollary A.3 Let (X, ρ) be a complete metric space and T : X → X be a contraction
mapping with fixed point v ∈ X. If X ′ is a closed subset of X and T (X ′) ⊆ X ′ (where
T (X ′) is the image of X ′ under T ). Then v ∈ X ′.
Proof Let v0 ∈ X ′ and {Tnv0} denote a sequence in X ′ with limit v. Since {Tnv0} → v as
n→∞ and X ′ closed, we have v ∈ X ′. 
Corollary A.4 Let (X, ρ) be a complete metric space, let T : X → X and suppose that for
some integer N , TN : X → X is a contraction mapping with modulus β. Then (i) T has
one fixed point in X, (ii) for any v0 ∈ X, ρ(T k·Nv0, v) ≤ βk · ρ(v0, v) for all k = 1, 2, . . . .
Proof Let v be a fixed point of the contraction mapping TN . Then
ρ(Tv, v) = ρ[T (TNv), TNv] = ρ[TN (Tv), TNv] ≤ β · ρ(Tv, v).
The first equality holds since TNv = v. The final inequality holds since TN is a contraction
mapping with modulus β by assumption. By definition 0 < β < 1. Hence, ρ(Tv, v) can only
happen to be 0. Thus, Tv = v and v is a fixed point of X. The second statement (ii) can
be derived in the same manner as in the contraction mapping theorem. 
Theorem A.5 Let B(S) be the space of bounded functions f : S → R with the sup norm.
Let T : B(S) → B(S) be an operator defined on B(S) satisfying: (i) Let f, g ∈ B(S). For
each s ∈ S, f(s) ≥ g(s) implies Tf(s) ≥ Tg(s) (monotonicity). (ii) Let a ∈ (0,∞) be
a constant. There is a β ∈ (0, 1) such that, for f ∈ B(S), T (f + a)(s) ≤ Tf(s) + β · a
(discounting). If T : B(S)→ B(S) satisfies both properties, then T is a contraction mapping
with modulus β.
Proof If f(s) ≤ g(s) for all s ∈ S, then f ≤ g. By the definition of a metric ‖.‖ we have
f ≤ g + ‖f − g‖ for any f, g ∈ B(S). Applying both properties to the latter inequality we
obtain
Tf ≤ T (g + ‖f − g‖) ≤ Tg + β · ‖f − g‖.
Reversing the initial assumption to g ≤ f we have
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Tg ≤ T (f + ‖f − g‖) ≤ Tf + β · ‖f − g‖.
The first inequality holds by the monotonicity assumption while second one reflects the
discounting property. Combining both we get
‖Tf − Tg‖ ≤ β · ‖f − g‖.

A.4 Mean-Variance Frontier Graphs
Figure 2 may be reproduced using the following R code. All analyses were performed using
the R statistical software R version 2.9.2 (2009-08-24).
#install.packages("tseries")
#install.packages("dynlm")
#install.packages("zoo")
#install.packages("fSeries")
#install.packages("fBasics")
#install.packages("fArma")
library("tseries")
library("dynlm")
library("zoo")
library("fSeries")
library("fBasics")
library("fArma")
# Vector of expected returns
r_i = c(0.05, 0.12)
# Target return and risk free rate
r_P <- 0.07
r_rf <- 0.06
# Vector of standard deviations for each asset
sig_i <- c(0.09, 0.10)
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# Vector containing 1s
e <- c(1,1)
# Correlation and covariance
correl <- -0.8
cova <- correl*sig_i[1]*sig_i[2]
# Covariance matrix and inverse
covar <- matrix(c(sig_i[1]^2, cova, cova, sig_i[2]^2), 2, 2)
icovar <- inv(covar)
# Closed form optimization
a <- as.vector(t(r_i)%*%icovar%*%r_i)
b <- as.vector(t(r_i)%*%icovar%*%e)
cc <- as.vector(t(e)%*%icovar%*%e)
d <- a*cc-b*b
w_a <- icovar%*%(r_i-e*r_rf)
w_b <- r_P-r_rf
w_c <- t(r_i-e*r_rf)%*%w_a
w_d <- w_b/w_c
# Vector of optimal weights
w <- w_a*as.vector(w_d)
w_rf <- 1 - sum(w)
# Tangential portfolio
gam_ma <- a-2*b*r_rf+cc*r_rf^2
w_tang <- w_a/(b-cc*r_rf)
r_tang <- t(w_tang)%*%r_i
risk_tang <- gam_ma / (b-cc*r_rf)^2
portrisk <- w_b^2/gam_ma
# Minimum variance portfolio
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mvp_risk <- 1/cc
mvp_return <- b/cc
w_mvp <- 1/cc*icovar%*%e
portret <- seq(from=0, to=max(r_i)+0.02, length=1000)
# Vector containing portfolio returns
portvar <- NULL
# Vector containing portfolio variances of combined assets
for(i in 1:length(portret)){
# loop calculating variances for corresponding returns
risk <- (portret[i]-r_rf)^2/gam_ma
portvar <- c(portvar, risk)
}
portstd <- portvar^0.5
# Efficient Frontier without Riskless Asset
portrett <- seq(from=0, to=max(r_i)+0.02, length=1000)
portvarr <- NULL
# loop calculating variances for corresponding returns
for(i in 1:length(portrett))
{
portvarr <- c(portvarr, 1/d*(cc*portrett[i]^2-2*b*portrett[i]+a))
}
portstdd <- portvarr^0.5
# Mean variance frontier asymptotes with perfect negative correlation
stddev <- seq(from=0, to=sig_i[2], length=1000)
stddev1 <- seq(from=0, to=sig_i[1], length=1000)
portret2 <- sig_i[2]/sum(sig_i)*r_i[1] +
sig_i[1]/sum(sig_i)*r_i[2] + (r_i[2]-r_i[1])/sum(sig_i)*stddev
portret3 <- sig_i[2]/sum(sig_i)*r_i[1] +
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sig_i[1]/sum(sig_i)*r_i[2] + (r_i[1]-r_i[2])/sum(sig_i)*stddev1
plot(stddev, portret2, type="l", lty=2)
lines(stddev, portret3, type="l", lty=2)
# Mean variance frontier asymptotes with perfect positive correlation
w <- seq(from=0, to=1, length=1000)
portret4 <- w*r_i[1]+(1-w)*r_i[2]
stddev2 <- (w^2*sig_i[1]^2+(1-w)^2*sig_i[2]^2+2*w*(1-w)*sig_i[1]*sig_i[2])^0.5
plot(stddev2, portret4, type="l", lty=2)
# Plot
color <- "black"
plot(portstd, portret, col=color, type="l", lty="solid",
lwd="1", main="Mean-Variance Frontier",
xlab="Standard Deviation", ylab="Expected Return",
cex.lab=0.75, cex.main=0.75, xlim=c(0,0.15))
lines(portstdd, portrett, lty="solid", lwd="1")
lines(stddev, portret2, type="l", lty=2)
lines(stddev1, portret3, type="l", lty=2)
lines(stddev2, portret4, type="l", lty=2)
points(sig_i[1], r_i[1], col=color, bg=color, pch=21)
points(sig_i[2], r_i[2], col=color, bg=color, pch=21)
points(mvp_risk^0.5, mvp_return, col=color, bg=color, pch=21)
points(sqrt(risk_tang), r_tang, col=color, bg=color, pch=21)
points(0, r_rf, col=color, bg=color, pch=21)
text(0, r_rf, "risk free rate", font=1, cex=0.75, pos=4)
text(sig_i[1], r_i[1], "asset 1", font=1, cex=0.75, pos=4)
text(sig_i[2], r_i[2], "asset 2", font=1, cex=0.75, pos=4)
text(mvp_risk^0.5, mvp_return, "minimum variance portfolio",
font=1, cex=0.75, pos=4)
text(sqrt(risk_tang), r_tang, "tangential portfolio", font=1,
cex=0.75, pos=4)
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